[madez]

Efail was a problem specific to e-mail, not pgp. BTW, if you attacked e-mail as the insecure by design, factually oligarchic communication system it is, I'd be totally in agreement.

GPG supports ed25519 ecc identities, which can be used in SSH, too. Which shorter keys are you referring to?

And to once again repeat the question begging an answer: which alternative do you propose to independently create and manage a cryptographic identity?

I think you owe an answer to that question given how you criticize the de facto standard for it.

[tptacek]

I don't know what "create and manage a cryptographic identity" means, and I do this stuff for a living. Can you put that in terms that actual people care about?

GPG supports ed25519. In some spec somewhere or other, and probably in a version of GnuPG as well, GPG supports everything. But in practice, GPG is RSA and CAST5 in CFB mode with PGP's archaic authenticator. And the impact of Efail was to email, the same way the impact of a memory corruption vulnerability might be to pop calc.exe (at first). But the flaw behind Efail was that GPG released unauthenticated plaintext to callers, which is something cryptosystems are meant never to do.