[zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC]

Just to avoid that confusion: "certain" is not the same as "so incredibly sure that it would be world-shattering to discover otherwise", even though the former often is used colloquially to mean the latter. I'm pretty sure that that is some equivocation that's going on here.

> I do apply it to other things.

So, you are saying that there is a claim that you are absolutely certain about?

> This would result in the same infinite hierarchically regressive death spiral as above.

Except there is no such thing. There is nothing in not being absolutely certain about anything that prevents you from still coming to conclusions and acting on them, and in many cases at least locally successfully so. There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything. And as such, you are simply demanding that I make an unjustified claim because that claim is an assumption that you want to make, and you maybe will refuse to engage unless I make that claim.

But that is not a problem that I can solve. I hold the position that absolute certainty is unjustified, and I am willing to help you understand that perspective if you are interested. You can either drop your assumption for the sake of the discussion, so you can maybe understand how my perspective makes sense, or you can insist that I should be sharing your assumption, which certainly will not allow you to understand my perspective.

In particular, you may want to take another close look at the examples that you used, apparently to try and construct contradictions from my statements. What you maybe want to pay attention to is whether those are actually contradictions (that is, self-inconsistent). It seems to me that many really just demonstrate that what I said contradicts the assumption of (the need for) absolute certainty. Which I'll readily admit they do. But that is not inconsistent, because that is not an assumption that I share. As such, they are expressions of how hard you find to accept what I said, which is fair--but they do not show a problem in my argument or reasoning.

[sonusario]

> Just to avoid that confusion: "certain" is not the same as "so incredibly sure that it would be world-shattering to discover otherwise", even though the former often is used colloquially to mean the latter. I'm pretty sure that that is some equivocation that's going on here.

I don't mean "so incredibly sure that it would be world-shattering to discover otherwise" when I say certain. I mean "Known for sure; established beyond doubt".

> So, you are saying that there is a claim that you are absolutely certain about?

Yes. I've already said so. Consider re-reading my previous comment in light of my response "to avoid that confusion".

> There is nothing in not being absolutely certain about anything that prevents you from still coming to conclusions and acting on them, and in many cases at least locally successfully so.

Agreed. Those conclusions have less basis, but our knowledge can wind up aligned with the truth without us being certain.

> There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything.

Then we are done with our conversation. If you can't be certain of anything, then all of logic is suspect.

This flies in the face of a comment you've made previously in two ways, both regarding logic and your awareness: "Which you can't [with your senses, demonstrate that the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" is false] because it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false."

[zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC]

> I mean "Known for sure; established beyond doubt".

OK!

> Yes. I've already said so. Consider re-reading my previous comment in light of my response "to avoid that confusion".

Well, possibly you have, just trying to avoid confusion.

Could you give one example of such a claim? (Yes, I understand you might already have mentioned one, I just want to be sure I am not misrepresenting you.)

> Agreed. Those conclusions have less basis, but our knowledge can wind up aligned with the truth without us being certain.

Exactly! But note: "less basis" does not mean "no basis". Also, just asserting certainty doesn't give you any more basis, only actually having justified certainty does. The fact that you might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) your beliefs does not mean it's something you can actually have.

> Then we are done with our conversation. If you can't be certain of anything, then all of logic is suspect.

Well, yes, of course it is!? Are you saying that you have never made what you now consider errors in your logical thinking, where you were convinced that you came to a conclusion through correct logical reasoning and later came to the conclusion that you were wrong about that?! And if that has happened to you (I mean, it happened in this thread, so I assume you will agree that it has happened to you?), then how would you distinguish logical conclusions or methods of logical reasoning that you are certain are correct from those that you currently are mistakenly convinced are correct? And if you you can't distinguish those, how would not all of logic be suspect, at least just enough to not justify labeling it as absolutely certain?

And maybe more importantly: How is that relevant to our conversation? Either we agree on some claim or argument or we don't, how does it make any difference whether either one of us is certain about it?!

> This flies in the face of a comment you've made previously in two ways, both regarding logic and your awareness:

I don't see how, could you explain?

[sonusario]

> Could you give one example of such a claim?

It is certain that you can't be certain of the claim "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about". You can't be certain "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about" without contradicting that claim, thus it is not possible to truthfully assert that claim in any way. Where there are no other possibilities, you have certainty.

> Also, just asserting certainty doesn't give you any more basis, only actually having justified certainty does.

Agreed. If you lack certainty about that though, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that just asserting certainty does give you more basis.

> The fact that you might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) your beliefs does not mean it's something you can actually have.

It ought to be sought out where possible, because it can actually be had. Also, if you lack certainty about that, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that the fact one might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) their beliefs does mean it's something they can actually have.

> How would you distinguish logical conclusions or methods of logical reasoning that you are certain are correct from those that you currently are mistakenly convinced are correct?

By distinguishing what possibilities have/haven't been ruled out.

> How is that relevant to our conversation?

Not knowing of any reason to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for most conversation. Resisting all reasons to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for any conversation.

> I don't see how, could you explain?

Your statement "There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything", expresses a lack of certainty in all claims, which includes tautological claims and claims of awareness, "awareness" being comparable to "senses".

If you lack certainty regarding tautological claims, then you think there is a chance, however small, that tautological claims could be shown to be false. You are open to the idea, however unlikely you take it to be, of logical contradictions being true, and thus are open, even if only a little, to asserting the illogical.

If you lack certainty regarding your awareness, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that there are things in reality, as far as you are aware, that guarantees that one can be certain about something.

[zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC]

> It is certain that you can't be certain of the claim "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about". You can't be certain "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about" without contradicting that claim, thus it is not possible to truthfully assert that claim in any way.

Hu?

1. People at least constantly claim that they are certain about self-contradictory things (that they themselves don't realize are/don't see as self-contradictory), so ... evidently, it is possible to be certain about that!?

2. What does truthfulness have to do with any of this? How does me being uncertain of a claim make it impossible for either the claim to be true or for me to assert it!?

> Where there are no other possibilities, you have certainty.

So, how did you exclude the possibility that there is a flaw in the logical reasoning that we both haven't realized yet?

> Agreed. If you lack certainty about that though, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that just asserting certainty does give you more basis.

So? All you seem to be saying here is "but then you can't be certain!". Yeah, duh? The fact that some reasoning conflicts with an assumption that you want to make does not invalidate the reasoning, it just means that it conflicts with that assumption.

> It ought to be sought out where possible, because it can actually be had.

Well, that is the claim that you are making.

> Also, if you lack certainty about that, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that the fact one might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) their beliefs does mean it's something they can actually have.

So? (see above)

> By distinguishing what possibilities have/haven't been ruled out.

And how would you distinguish those cases where you have correctly ruled out a possibility from those cases where you have mistakenly ruled out a possibility?

> Not knowing of any reason to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for most conversation.

Why?

How do claims of certainty possibly add anything to a conversation? One side makes a claim/argument, the other either agrees or doesn't. If both sides agree, that claim can be used for building further arguments on it, which, again, the other side either agrees to or doesn't. If the other side doesn't agree, you have to explain your position based on things they previously agreed to, to work out whether you can get them to agree, or to possibly revise their positions on stuff they previously agreed upon, or to possibly revise your own position to get to an agreement on a different claim.

How does certainty play any role in this? Does asserting "but I am certain" ever help with convincing anyone (who obviously isn't certain of the same thing, or they wouldn't be disagreeing)? Does it add anything when you agree with someone, and then you also both say "and we are also both certain of this!"? Does it have any use if someone agrees with you on a claim, but you insist that they also agree to the claim that they are certain about that claim, or else you will act as if they didn't agree with you on the first claim either?

As far as I can see, knowing anything for certain isn't just not necessary for most conversation, it's also completely useless. Like, even if you were justified in being absolutely certain on some claim, I don't see how that is of any use whatsoever for a conversation.

> Resisting all reasons to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for any conversation.

So, if there are in fact no reasons to think otherwise, then that is a non-starter for any conversation?!

> If you lack certainty regarding tautological claims, then you think there is a chance, however small, that tautological claims could be shown to be false.

No, that is just you assuming certainty to demonstrate certainty, i.e., circular reasoning. Yes, if I assume that I can determine with absolute certainty that a given claim is tautological, and that I can determine with absolute certainty the correct result of all my thoughts, then ... I could determine with absolute certainty the correct result of all my thoughts. But that's just a very convoluted way to express an assumption, not a demonstration of anything.

Tautologies are, by definition, true, and I agree with you on that. So what is the point of demanding that I also agree that I could not possibly be mistaken in my understanding of the definition of "tautology", that I could not possibly ever end up considering a false statement to be a tautology, that I could not possibly ever be wrongly convinced that a statement that is in fact tautological could be demonstrated to be false? Why do you require that I declare that I will not change my mind on what the common definition of "tautology" is, no matter what evidence you show me (that is: that I declare that this is "beyond doubt")? What good could possibly come from that, even if we ignore all the problems that could come from such a stance?

> You are open to the idea, however unlikely you take it to be, of logical contradictions being true, and thus are open, even if only a little, to asserting the illogical.

No, I am simply open to the idea that what I think are logical contradictions are in fact not.

> If you lack certainty regarding your awareness, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that there are things in reality, as far as you are aware, that guarantees that one can be certain about something.

So? Again and again, you make these statements that lead to contradictions with the assumption of absolute certainty ... but why would you do that if you want to convince someone who doesn't share that assumption?

[sonusario]

> Like, even if you were justified in being absolutely certain on some claim, I don't see how that is of any use whatsoever for a conversation.

Then what was the purpose of your demanding, "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about", if being certain about some claim is of no use, even if it could be justified?

===

To set things in order:

You claim that "Religion is incompatible with science" because, as you've claimed, they contradict in stating what is or is not warranted regarding the assertion of falsifiable claims.

Your argument fails on the grounds that it has not established that religion makes non-falsifiable claims. Moreover, when I pushed you on this regarding a specific claim you provided, asking "Assuming your saying "It is not warranted" because the claim "God exists" is not falsifiable, how has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim?", you asked: "What would you accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that you believe in?", leaving it to me to establish your position.

The issues with that aside, if I where to answer that question similar to the way you answered one of mine...

"

s> "After falsifying the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm", is the claim "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm" falsifiable, and if so how might it be falsified?"

z> By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!

"

... then I could say, "By demonstrating that God doesn't exist?!", and I could apply the same format to all questions asking how I might falsify some religions claim, which is absurd.

Your argument also fails on the grounds of not having a coherent use of the term "falsifiable":

You've stated that making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted, and have also stated "it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false". Either tautological statements contradict your claim that non-falsifiable claims are unwarranted to make or you'll need to establish that they are indistinguishable from shit just made up (this distinguishing presumably being the reason you think making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted).

By your own words, every claim asserting the falsification of a falsifiable claim is falsifiable, which defeats the purpose of calling claims falsifiable to begin with. By your words, you can't falsify a claim without any doubt that the falsification can't be falsified, effectively making all falsifiable claims non-falsifiable, a contradiction.

Regarding Certainty: Without certainty, you can't potentially show that a claim is false, only that it is likely to be false, thus another collapse of your notion of "falsifiable". If there is no potential to show that a claim is false, then it is not falsifiable.

===

You have less basis for your claim "Religion is incompatible with science" than you have of the the claim "Some claims can be known with certainty".

Are you uncertain of your own existence? Maybe uncertain in mode, but that you exist in any way at all? Do you think that the certainty of ones existence is an unwarranted assumption? To think as such is self defeating.

[zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC]

> Then what was the purpose of your demanding, "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about", if being certain about some claim is of no use, even if it could be justified?

I didn't ask you to be justified in being certain, I asked you to demonstrate that you are (or anyone else is) justified in being certain. Being justified seems to be useless, demonstrating that you are justified is not.

> Your argument fails on the grounds that it has not established that religion makes non-falsifiable claims.

Seriously? You are seriously contesting that a defining characteristic of religion is that it makes non-falsifiable claims?

> [...] you asked: "What would you accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that you believe in?", leaving it to me to establish your position.

The fact that I am measuring the falsifiability of your position does not mean that you are establishing my position.

Would you prefer if I argued against a randomly selected religious position of other people that you probably don't agree with, and will you accept me demonstrating that that position is not falsifiable as demonstration that your position is not falsifiable?

> ... then I could say, "By demonstrating that God doesn't exist?!", and I could apply the same format to all questions asking how I might falsify some religions claim, which is absurd.

Which just demonstrates that you don't understand what falsifiability is?

What I describe is a very specific observation: A container with liquid water in it that is measured to be at a pressure of 1 atm and at a temperature of 149.9999 °C, and the temperature of the water vapor coming off of it measuring as 150 °C (or in short: water boiling only at 150 °C). That observation would falsify the claim that water does not boil only at 150 °C.

What you desribe is ... nothing of the sort? You give zero criteria by which to decide whether the experiment has failed.

> You've stated that making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted, and have also stated "it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false". Either tautological statements contradict your claim that non-falsifiable claims are unwarranted to make or you'll need to establish that they are indistinguishable from shit just made up (this distinguishing presumably being the reason you think making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted).

You are confusing "formal truths" and "real truths".

> By your own words, every claim asserting the falsification of a falsifiable claim is falsifiable, which defeats the purpose of calling claims falsifiable to begin with. By your words, you can't falsify a claim without any doubt that the falsification can't be falsified, effectively making all falsifiable claims non-falsifiable, a contradiction.

Is there some negation or some quantifier wrong in this? I have a hard time figuring out what that second sentence means ...

> Regarding Certainty: Without certainty, you can't potentially show that a claim is false, only that it is likely to be false, thus another collapse of your notion of "falsifiable". If there is no potential to show that a claim is false, then it is not falsifiable.

That's, again, only a problem resulting from your demand for certainty. Certainty is not a requirement for falsification. Falsification is not about making certain that a claim is false. Seriously, just stop assuming that anyone but you is demanding certainty for anything. All these arguments of yours boil down to "but then you can't be certain!". Yes, DUH! I have told you again and again that I do not share this assumption of yours, so, please, stop making that assumption. Either justify the claim, or work without it. If your argument only makes sense under the assumption that someone demands certainty, it is not a relevant argument for this discussion. If your argument shows that my position is inconsistent with absolute certainty, that only shows that my position is consistent in that regard.

> Are you uncertain of your own existence? Maybe uncertain in mode, but that you exist in any way at all? Do you think that the certainty of ones existence is an unwarranted assumption? To think as such is self defeating.

That smells like essentialism?

I mean, you are aware that there are delusional people, right? Like, people who have an almost completely wrong idea about their identity? Are these people justified in being certain that they exist?