Quite the opposite - it makes more and more companies to consider open source. RISC-V is all rage now, people turning their eyes to open source EDAs. I hope with the help of SymbiFlow[1], Chisel[2]/FIRRTL[3], and other similar tools the duopoly of Intel (Altera) and Xilinx will come to its end. There is also an interesting initiative[4] to make ASIC design as affordable (in terms of time, knowledge, and money) as possible. And using KiCad[5] for simple projects can help for small businesses.
The issue is not that it reduces interest in open source. In fact the article states there's evidence that open source solutions are getting renewed attention in the Chinese government.
The issue is that the executive order would make it unlawful to share technology with foreign adversaries. So it effectively forces open source projects to hard fork along geopolitical boundaries. For example, if (and these are still if's) Huawei were to be designated a foreign adversary; and, if Huawei were to develop a RISC-V implementation of interest; it would be unlawful for a US person to use that implementation, or otherwise "acquire" said technology from Huawei.
The underlying premise of the executive order, as I understand it, is that technology developed by, or under the influence of, foreign adversaries is potentially tainted. Thus to defend the US national security interest, US persons shall be penalized for using their technology.
Thus the concern is that US-based open source developers and users would be directly at risk by interacting with the very projects you cite, should they fall under the influence of a foreign adversary.
Or to put it more concretely: ARM might be very happy if Huawei were designated a foreign adversary, and Huawei invested heavily in RISC-V. Because then ARM could lobby US lawmakers to rule that RISC-V technology is tainted under the theories contained in the executive order, thus reducing competition from open source alternatives.
The issue is that the executive order would make it unlawful to share technology with foreign adversaries. So it effectively forces open source projects to hard fork along geopolitical boundaries. For example, if (and these are still if's) Huawei were to be designated a foreign adversary; and, if Huawei were to develop a RISC-V implementation of interest; it would be unlawful for a US person to use that implementation, or otherwise "acquire" said technology from Huawei.
The underlying premise of the executive order, as I understand it, is that technology developed by, or under the influence of, foreign adversaries is potentially tainted. Thus to defend the US national security interest, US persons shall be penalized for using their technology.
Thus the concern is that US-based open source developers and users would be directly at risk by interacting with the very projects you cite, should they fall under the influence of a foreign adversary.
Or to put it more concretely: ARM might be very happy if Huawei were designated a foreign adversary, and Huawei invested heavily in RISC-V. Because then ARM could lobby US lawmakers to rule that RISC-V technology is tainted under the theories contained in the executive order, thus reducing competition from open source alternatives.
(editted to clean up grammar)