[sonusario]

You > "But there simply is no such thing as "the reliability of the claim" that is distinct from "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim...".

Also you (in response to my question "And claims that are correct descriptions of reality are not reliable "_for_" such use?")> "Oh, sure, of course they are!"

> The way "the reliability of the claim" is commonly used is simply as a short-hand to refer to what more precisely would be called "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim".

Would you provide a source on this being the common usage?

> Do you agree that made-up claims have a greater probability of being untrue rather than true?

If that is the case, it is not obvious, because for every claim "X" there is also the claim "not X", meaning that exactly half all claims are true. So you'll need to establish what would tip that balance.

> Seems sensible to me!

Let A be the true claim "this bridge can bear 1632 tons", and the method that produced it is "making the claim A up on the spot".

Would you still say these phrases are equal?: "the claim A is reliable" = "it is likely the claim A is true" = "making the claim A up on the spot to establish claim A is reliable"?

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> By showing that whoever is holding the supposedly unfalsifiable position would actually accept some demonstrations as reasons to reject the claim?

Are you asking me?

=======

0) According to you: If X is falsifiable, then X "is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true, [but that] all attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all".

===

1) If the claim "X is not falsifiable" is falsifiable, then "X is not falsifiable" "is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true, [but that] all attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all". (Substitution 0)

2) According to you: The claim "X is not falsifiable" is falsifiable"?". (ASSUMPTION)

3) Therefore: The "X is not falsifiable" "is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true, [but that] all attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all". (Conditional Elimination from 1, 2)

=======

In other words, by your definitions, there is no way to establish with certainty that a claim is not falsifiable, if its not being falsifiable can be falsified.

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>> Is the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" falsifiable?

> Are we talking about "reliable for detecting ultimate reality" or "reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting"?

Reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting.

[zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC]

> You > "But there simply is no such thing as "the reliability of the claim" that is distinct from "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim...".

> Also you (in response to my question "And claims that are correct descriptions of reality are not reliable "_for_" such use?")> "Oh, sure, of course they are!"

I'm not sure what you are getting at?! If you think I should be objecting to you using the word "correct", because that is a property of the claim itself and not dependent on the method used to arrive at it: Sure, assume that I object to that. But it seemed to me that that wasn't relevant to what you were actually asking about, namely, whether reliability of a claim implies potential usefulness of that claim _for_ some further purpose.

> Would you provide a source on this being the common usage?

I really don't understand why you are asking this. I already explained why the notion of reliability of the claim itself doesn't make any sense/is a category error. And I suppose that you would agree that people do use phrases like "claim X is reliable", and that it is usually perfectly understandable what they mean by that. Also, under the interpretation that I suggested, you generally do understand what people are trying to tell you when they use such a phrase, while avoiding the obvious logical nonsense that follows if you assume that reliability is a property of the claim itself.

Now, it may well be true that many people who use such a phrase have never really thought through what exactly they mean by that, and thus have never made a conscious decision of whether they are using one definition or the other. But that isn't a reason to think that they likely intend to use a definition that leads to contradictions.

It seems like you are asking me to provide a source for the claim that people are not generally intending to talk nonsense. It's not that that isn't a thing that can be investigated empirically, but I doubt that you actually disagree on this.

> If that is the case, it is not obvious, because for every claim "X" there is also the claim "not X", meaning that exactly half all claims are true. So you'll need to establish what would tip that balance.

Well, while that is kinda true, it's also not really particularly relevant in this context? Even if there were a 50/50 chance, that would not be a useful source of information, would it?

The other problem with that perspective is that it counts redundant claims more than once. Like, if some measurement of X could give the result 0, 1, or 2, then "X is not 0" is the same claim as "X is 1 or 2", just phrased differently. So, if you want to get a useful result, you have to rather compare non-redundant claims of the same structure and at the same resolution. If you do that, you notice that there in particular are tons of claims about numerical values, and that there is an infinite number of either discrete values of or equal-sized intervals that you could plug into any such claim to make up new claims--but for any particular measurement, only one of those infinitely many possible values or ranges will correspond to reality, and almost all claims that you could make up this way will be wrong.

If you don't find that convincing, I guess we might also replace "made-up claims are almost all false" with "made-up claims are no more likely to be true than chance", as you seem to already be agreeing with that? I don't think I drew any conclusions that require the stronger claim, so we might as well go with a lower lower bound instead.

> Let A be the true claim "this bridge can bear 1632 tons", and the method that produced it is "making the claim A up on the spot".

> Would you still say these phrases are equal?: "the claim A is reliable" = "it is likely the claim A is true" = "making the claim A up on the spot to establish claim A is reliable"?

Well, they all evaluate to false, so yes? Though I don't understand why you mention that the claim is true, as that makes no difference!? In the scenario you are describing, there is no reason for anyone to believe that it is true, because all they know is that someone made it up.

> Are you asking me?

No, I am telling you--though I wondered why you asked the original question, as the possibility to falsify that claim seems kinda ovious!?

> In other words, by your definitions, there is no way to establish with certainty that a claim is not falsifiable, if its not being falsifiable can be falsified.

So?

> Reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting.

Then I don't even understand what the point of that question is. Like, what else would our senses detect, if not what they detect?

Could we maybe transfer this to a different scenario where it isn't as easy to get confused by intuitions? Like, assume there exists a robot with a bunch of sensors. And let's assume you can remote-control this robot, and remotely read what its sensor inputs measure. Now, with this robot you could do what I described above: You could check all those sensors for consistency. And maybe you could somehow communicate with other robots and check for consistency with the readings of their sensors. None of that guarantees that the robot (and thus you through it) sees "real reality", for all you know, it was built with all sensor connectors linked up to a computer that generates fake sensor signals from a simulation running on that computer, including a simulation of the stimuli from interacting with other (actually simulated) robots. But you said that that wasn't what we were talking about. So, if we aren't talking about that, then we are talking about actual sensors!? Is your question whether this guarantees that the sensors are free of any defects? (Well, no?) Or whether it is guaranteed that the robot itself can not be defective? (No?)

Or ... what else? I really don't understand what you are asking here.

[sonusario]

Anything you've said with > ... reliability is a property of the claim itself ...

I have never stated that I thought this. You may have thought my wording implied that, but that has never been what I was getting at. You've incorrectly inferred this on your own, so I never addressed any statement you made regarding it as it was getting away from the point. But clearly since you've struggled to wrap your head around that, I've now spelled it out for you.

> It seems like you are asking me to provide a source for the claim that people are not generally intending to talk nonsense. It's not that that isn't a thing that can be investigated empirically, but I doubt that you actually disagree on this.

No, I've been getting at asking why you think people mean "the method used to arrive at claim X is reliable" rather than something like "claim X can be trusted for use", when "claim X is reliable" is stated.

Your stance is also noticeably less coherent when it is considered that "claim X" can't be replaced by "this wrench" or "this car" and not lack significant ambiguity ("the method used to arrive at this car is reliable"). Where as if you were to replace "claim X" in "claim X can be trusted for use" for "this car", you'd get "this car can be trusted for use".

What you've done is equivocate, using "reliability" differently for claims versus how it is used in all other areas. In particular using it in reference to X on one hand and in reference to the method that derived X on the other, which has nothing like a mechanical analog to help indicate that your usage is one that matches the usage of anyone else outside of your own head.

> Even if there were a 50/50 chance, that would not be a useful source of information, would it?

Then perhaps what you mean is: Made-up claims have a greater probability of being untrue than claims that are not made up. If that is the case are you asserting that "Any method that doesn't make up claims has a greater probability of being true than any methods that do make up claims"?

> Well, they all evaluate to false, so yes?

So, you think it is possible for some claim to be true and it not be likely that said claim is true?

> So?

According to you: The assertion of any claim that is not falsifiable is not warranted.

This has no certain basis, by your definitions. As a result this means that no claim should be ignored just because it is currently considered to not be falsifiable.

Another question comes to mind. Say you claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm". You then perform a test on water at "1 atm", and it boils at 100°C. Having falsified the original claim, according to you, you can now say "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm".

After falsifying the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm", is the claim "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm" falsifiable, and if so how might it be falsified?

> Then I don't even understand what the point of that question is. Like, what else would our senses detect, if not what they detect?

That's partly my point, they wouldn't, and the other part is to have you recognize that there is a self-evidently true claim that is not falsifiable. You can't falsify the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable". To say that you could would be to say you have the potential to reliably, with your senses, demonstrate that the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" is false.

[zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC]

> So, you think it is possible for some claim to be true and it not be likely that said claim is true?

Imagine I came to you and told you that I had determined that some bridge could bear 1632 tons, and that I had determined that by rolling dice, one for each digit. You don't know anything else about this bridge. Would you say that my claim is

(a) likely to be true

(b) likely to be false

(c) you have no clue how likely it is to be true or false

?

> This has no certain basis, by your definitions.

So? I didn't claim I had a certain basis. Do you have a certain basis for any belief? And if not, why are you bringing this up?

> After falsifying the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm", is the claim "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm" falsifiable, and if so how might it be falsified?

By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!

> That's partly my point, they wouldn't, and the other part is to have you recognize that there is a self-evidently true claim that is not falsifiable. You can't falsify the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable".

But that isn't self-evidently true, it's simply tautologically true. "What we perceive is what we perceive". Duh?

As far as we know, everything we perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

And far as "the reality we perceive" is concerned, it's a trivial, tautological statement, not some insight about the world. That statement would even be true if we didn't perceive anything.

> To say that you could would be to say you have the potential to reliably, with your senses, demonstrate that the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" is false.

Which you can't because it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false.

[sonusario]

> Would you say that my claim is... ?

And by asking a question, you have no answer for mine? You seem to think that claims aren't true or false if we don't know whether they are true or false. What your doing is equivocating the likelihood of the method to produce true claims with whether a stated claim is likely to be true.

> I didn't claim I had a certain basis.

So you are not certain if religion is incompatible with science?

> By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!

So, by your words, every falsifiable claim is not falsifiable with certainty, because any claim X that states the falsification of some falsifiable claim Y can be falsified.

> As far as we know, everything we perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

How do you know this with certainty?

As far as you know everything you perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are not in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

[zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC]

> And by asking a question, you have no answer for mine?

Your line of questions seemed to be missing the point, which is why I tried to make things easier by asking you how you would understand language in this context.

> You seem to think that claims aren't true or false if we don't know whether they are true or false.

Nope.

> What your doing is equivocating the likelihood of the method to produce true claims with whether a stated claim is likely to be true.

No, I am not equivocating those, those just are the same thing, and I am almost certain that you also use language in this way, even though it seems like maybe you aren't aware of it. Which is why I asked you that one simple question, to see whether you actually do.

> So you are not certain if religion is incompatible with science?

I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about. Demanding a burden of proof that you don't apply to anything else is simply destructive behaviour, not something that could possibly lead to any insight.

> How do you know this with certainty?

Just remove "certainly". The point is: I haven't seen any, I doubt you have seen any, I doubt anyone has seen any. If you have some, feel free to share it.

> As far as you know everything you perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are not in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

Correct. Which is why I am not making that claim.

[sonusario]

> I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about.

So apparently you are uncertain that you've just stated "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about"... lol, wow.

Haha, are you certain you won't answer any further questions about whether you are certain about something until I show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about? If not, are you certain that you are not certain? If so, well then now you know there is something you can possibly be certain about. If not, are you certain?

> Demanding a burden of proof that you don't apply to anything else is simply destructive behaviour, not something that could possibly lead to any insight.

Smh, tsk tsk. I do apply it to other things. At the moment, however, we are dealing with your "uncertain" claims, a burden which is evermore appearing to be too much for you, especially now, given that you have now revealed that you've not intended to say anything with certainty. Perhaps, for all future claims you make, it would serve us well if you included wording that indicates your uncertainty.

> Just remove "certainly".

If you're going to remove certainty from all of your claims, then we have reached the end of our discussion. I'm content with you not being certain of the claim "Religion is incompatible with science". You may feel that one can't be certain of anything, but it is certain that you can't be certain of that.

> The point is: I haven't seen any, I doubt you have seen any, I doubt anyone has seen any.

Well according to you, you are not certain that you doubt it. In addition, by your own expectations of uncertainty, you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it), and, to continue, you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it)), and you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it))), and so on...

Oh, and if you want to replace all certainty with likelihood, as in stating that "It is likely that religion is incompatible with science" to highlight your uncertainty of the claim "Religion is compatible with science", then the claim "It is likely that religion is incompatible with science" would also be uncertain. This would result in the same infinite hierarchically regressive death spiral as above. So... have fun with that.