[NeedMoreTea]

Nor any mention of the clear delays to D Day as a direct result of the sheer quantity of war materiel sent to Russia via the Arctic convoys and through Iran.

Hundreds of thousands of trucks and jeeps, tens of thousands of tanks and aircraft. Not second rate or surplus but Spitfires, Hurricanes, Sherman tanks and so on, and enough to restrict the allies.

It was deemed more important to try and help keep Russia in the war.

Reporting the claim uncritically is the distortion to my mind. The role Russia played in allied victory, but clearly not D Day, is rarely forgotten.

[cik2e]

> Nor any mention of the clear delays to D Day as a direct result of the sheer quantity of war materiel sent to Russia via the Arctic convoys and through Iran.

This idea sounds patently false and I can't find a single source to support it.

According to Wikipedia, the total US expenditure on Lend-Lease was 48 billion, with 31 of those going to Britain and 11 to the USSR [1]. But saying that D-Day was delayed as a result of the sheer quantity of aid sent to Britain would still be incorrect. Nearly the entirety of Soviet economic aid during the war can be attributed to the U.S. It provided the bulk of the actual raw materiel and effectively paid for the rest through the funding British production. Now combine this with the fact that Roosevelt and his advisors were pushing to open up the Western European front in 1942, a year after Lend-Lease had gone into effect, with Churchill winning out in opposition to the idea. It simply doesn't make sense that the cost of aid to the Soviet union was even part of the equation.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#Multilateral_Allied...

[NeedMoreTea]

31bn did NOT go to Britain. That was the gross figure to Britain and Empire including the dominions with independent governments. As they break it down no further I'd have to find a source with the true British figure.

Nor does it take off the roughly 8 or 10bn of British lend-lease to the US, or the end of war lend-lease loans. Or take into account the British lend-lease supplied to Russia, which was far from insignificant - your Wikipedia link mentions in the otherwise unpriced list £1.15bn of aero engines - that alone would be about $4.5bn US - as wartime exchange was pegged at $4 to £1.

Neither the US - nor anyone else - achieved a fully mobilised war economy overnight - supply was a constant issue for much of the war going on most of the histories I've read, and it was only by late 43/early 44 that the US was manufacturing her way out of trouble. Even that fairly poorly organised Wikipedia page includes the throwaway quote of "Even after the United States forces in Europe and the Pacific began to attain full strength during 1943–1944, Lend-Lease continued".

Russia got about 12% of all the jeeps produced, 50% of the P39s, etc.

It doesn't make sense that it wasn't part of the equation in several campaigns. Not the cost, but the logistics and production - number of tanks or whatever actually available in theatre. By 44 not so much.

Sledgehammer in 42 would have certainly failed, and failed badly. Much has been written about it. To summarise from Wikipedia - who write surprisingly little about it:

"However, the elements required for such an operation were lacking, i.e. air superiority, amphibious warfare equipment, sufficient forces and adequate supply. Despite all this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered Sledgehammer feasible.

If Sledgehammer had been carried out, the British could have landed only six divisions at most, whereas the Germans had 25-30 divisions in Western Europe"

It could very possibly have been the war losing campaign.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sledgehammer

[hardlianotion]

Yes, the Artic convoys, protected by the Royal Navy, delivered enough equipment to completely equip an army, and at horrible cost in ships and me. These routes had the largest number of ship losses in the war.

[edraferi]

I’ve never heard of this before. Any good place to learn more?