[empath75]

This doesn’t seem correct to me, but I can’t put my finger on why. Surely if both agree that’s more certainty than a single sensor reading. Granted a disagreement would be bad, but at least you would have some warning that one of them is wrong, whereas you would have none at all if relying on a single sensor.

[fhars]

It doesn't seem correct to you because they might have been trying to be sarcastic. Using two sensors would admit that they might disagree, and that there might be situations where the MCAS could not work. But there cannot be a situation where the MACS doesn't work if the MAX shall have the same type rating as previous 737s, so the sensors cannot disagree, and so it would be useless and wasteful to use two sensors. Issuing that disagreement warning would completely undermine the very reason for the existence of the MCAS.

[kejaed]

You wouldn’t be able to know which one was wrong but you’d be able to know and annunciate an AOA MISCOMPARE (which was an option on the Max) and then disable MCAS.

[weaksauce]

Which was not an option to upper management because that would cause training for the event of disengagement and a new type rating.