[contras1970]

no, it's just cargocult security.

edit after your reply: if you install in /tmp, you'll end up with /tmp/bin/dstat and /tmp/share/dstat. you're concerned that an attacker could smuggle something into /tmp/share/dstat, but /tmp/bin/dstat is of no worry? what exactly is the threat here?

> access control of `../share` in an unknown part of the filesystem is a matter for some concern. Given that the binary can be put basically anywhere, it would seem to be perilously close to CWD.

another edit since i cannot reply to you: do you have any examples of the "threat model [which] includes that you can't trust every part of the filesystem you're working from"? something concrete, specific. a particular install prefix that would let you create $prefix/bin/dstat but $prefix/share/dstat would be dangerous.

aaand, see my reply at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19989237

[Kalium]

I don't know. If your threat model includes that you can't trust every part of the filesystem you're working from, being extra paranoid about it isn't the most unreasonable thing in the world.

EDIT: A sibling points out the issue in more detail - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19989237