| > 1)... 2)... 3)... How do you determine that something is not testable? How do you determine that something is unreliable? When you say "Science says", what do you mean? When you say "Religion says", what do you mean? >> Is it possible that a testable claim could be true and imply another claim that is not testable? > No. Why? === > Yeah ... so? They are still wrong, and I am most likely not. How do you know that there is a greater chance that you are not wrong? What are the percentages you have calculated to conclude this? === > Doing science is to use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't. There is no fixed method, because that in itself would be unreliable. Is "use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't" a fixed method? > It is well-established that untestable claims are unreliable (and I have explained at length why) Would you please explain "at length" once more in the form of a syllogism that ends with the conclusion "Therefore all non-testable claims are unreliable"? > Either there is indeed a good reason to think it is in fact true, then science is wrong and needs to be corrected so it doesn't classify a reliable claim as unreliable It's becoming more clear that we seem to have different criterion for what we consider testable. Would you consider all claims that are provable or disprovable testable? Would you consider all claims that if true, and not provable or disprovable, are not testable? > No, the incompatibility comes from the fact that both are claims about the same subject matter, namely reality, and that those claims are contradictory. What are some claims of science and religion (regarding religion, particularly fundamental ones) that are contradictory, as in they claim opposing things (X and ~X)? Or are the only claims that are incompatible as far as you are concerned the ones stated in your above syllogism? === > All I mean is that you (kindof) have to make some assumption of sorts, because there is no way to prove ultimate reality or disprove hard solipsism. So, there is some first self-evident method that can't be tested for reliability without being circular? > You do know that by definition. Senses are, by definition, those inputs that reflect external reality. A definition you have assumed? Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying anything is wrong with that assumption, it is a self-evident one, but call it like it is. === >>> More precisely, because a statement about math is not a statement about reality, other than that math is part of (human) reality. >> When you apply the name "John" to one person and the name "Jack" to another, there are physical criterion to distinguish between John and Jack allowing us to verify via testing that a claim only about John is not a claim about Jack. Unless there are physical criterion that allows us to distinguish between math and reality, you've made a false analogy. >>> The answer is simply: They didn't. >> The conclusion I'm looking for is "They couldn't" and in particular "They couldn't intelligibly mean 'claims only about math are claims about reality'" and I want to know why. Only saying "they didn't" leaves the door open for someone else who could. ? === >> Under this axiomatic context: Do distances, spaces, cardinalities, and sets symbolically or conceptually exist absent of any physical representation? > I don't know. I certainly don't see any reason to believe so. Then you can't see any reason to believe '1 < 2' could make reference to anything other than the physical representations of distances of space, cardinalities of sets, and any other needed mathematical structures? === > The primary problem with that whole argument is that it considers having an explanation a property of the thing to be explained, rather than of the subject (not) understanding the thing. ========== 1 ) If X can't be explained, then X is unintelligible. 2 ) If X is unintelligible and X is a part of reality, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted. 3 ) If the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted, then all claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible. 4 ) If all claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible. 5 ) If the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted. ---------- 6 ) X is a part of reality and X can't be explained (ASSUME for RAA) 7 ) X is a part of reality (Conjunction Elimination from 6) 8 ) X can't be explained (Conjunction Elimination from 6) 9) X is unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 1, 8) 10) X is unintelligible and X is a part of reality (Conjunction Introduction 9, 7) 11) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted (Conditional Elimination from 2, 10) 12) All claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 3, 11) 13) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 4, 12) 14) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted (Conditional Elimination from 5, 13) 15) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted and the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted (Conjunction Introduction 11, 14) 16) Therefore: It is not the case that X is a part of reality and X can't be explained (Reductio Ad Absurdum from 6 to a contradiction on 15) --------- Rephrasing of the Conclusion: Either X is not a part of reality or X can be explained (De Morgan) Rephrase of the Rephrasing: If X is a part of reality then X can be explained (Implication) ========== > Could you then provide a criterion by which to distinguish the physical from the non-physical, that could be applied to an arbitrary object to determine whether it is physical or non-physical, and that's not using just vague terminology that could eaily be interpreted in a dozen different ways? To exist and be non-physical is to exist and be incapable of changing state, to exist and be incapable of changing state is to exist and be non-physical. === > Whether something is moral is completely determined by whether you think it is moral, and whether it is moral has no effect on whether it is moral? Wow have I done a terrible job of separating the conscience act from the external act. To be abundantly clear, it is immoral to violate your conscience. There can be two actions that occur when you perform an action: Choosing an action is itself an action, and performing the chosen action is separate from the choosing of that action. So if I where to correct my comments along these lines I would properly state: "It is immoral to [choose to] do what you think is immoral even if [what you choose to do] is moral, so you'll be better off doing [an action] you think is moral even if [that action] is immoral [because choosing to do otherwise would be immoral]. You are better off this way because you are not as/(at all) culpable for your actions if you didn't know they were wrong. That being said we are obligated to correct our neighbors' incorrect moral beliefs and to be open to being corrected." === > Sorry, but your claims really are getting absurd. Argumentum ad Lapidem Do you expect all true claims to sound rational before you've heard their justification? What did you expect given that I haven't been taking any steps to establish them? > Pretty much what you'd expect from someone who tries to find any justification for a predetermined conclusion, rather than following the evidence where it leads, though. "Ad Hominem" Ouch. Like you've done with 'claims only about math are not claims about reality'? (<- ad hominem) That might be what you'd expect, but if you claim that's the kind of person I am then you'll need to substantiate that claim. Lol, I've stated that I'm not taking any steps to establish my claims to you, as they don't usefully tie into to our compatibility discussion, several times now. > ... it simply means that you are making unsubstantiated claims. I've stated that I'm not taking any steps to establish my claims here several times now. Echo echo echo ... |
Because they are indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up. Do you agree that making shit up is not a reliable way to determine facts about reality?
> It's becoming more clear that we seem to have different criterion for what we consider testable.
I suspect that's a central problem, yes. The scientific notion of testability is something people with a religious background often seem to have difficulty wrapping their head around.
> Would you consider all claims that are provable or disprovable testable? Would you consider all claims that if true, and not provable or disprovable, are not testable?
First of all, just to make sure we aren't getting confused: This is all about "real truths", not about "formal truths", as "proof" is generally the term used by mathematics to describe derivation of formal truths, not so much by scientists, who would rather use terms like "evidence" or "demonstration" to describe, well, evidence for a hypothesis ... though people often colloquially use "proof" for either, even scientists, but it should be understood that it is being used in a meaning distinct from the mathematical use.
Also, I suspect that you are probably completely on the wrong track with "provability", even if I assume that you mean some sort of evidence-driven thing, because testability is not about whether some claim has been shown to be true or false, but about whether the claim could be shown to be false.
Testability is not a question of showing that something is true, because that isn't really a thing with inductive reasoning: For any model where you have not actually tested every prediction that you could derive from it (and those tend to be infinitely many for any non-trivial claims), you can not possibly be sure that there are no circumstances under which it would make a wrong prediction. So, testability is only concerned with showing that a claim is false, by demonstrating a contradiction, because you can indeed be sure that a model that makes predictions contradicted by a single test is incorrect (assuming you did not screw up the test, of course).
Now, of course, for a claim to be considered testable, it is not required that you demonstrate that it is false, that would be kinda pointless. The requirement is that you could potentially demonstrate it to be false if it were false.
So, for example, "water boils at 100 °C at atmospheric pressure" is testable, because there is an experiment that you could do that would contradict the claim if it weren't true. For example, if water actually only boiled at 200 °C, you could put together a demonstration where you heated water to 150 °C, showing that it didn't boil, thus contradicting the claim, thus demonstrating that it is false.
On the other hand, "invisible unicorns exist" is not testable, because there is no experiment that you could possibly do that would show it to be false. No matter what you observe about the world, there is no possible observation that could contradict the claim. That is simply because the claim does not make any predictions about observable reality--and if there is no prediction, there is no way to make an observation that would contradict any prediction.
Another common form of untestable claims, especially from religious people, is of the form "God listens to prayer and sends you help when you need it. When you pray, but you don't receive the help you think you need, god knew better that you actually didn't need the help you thought you needed." So, you pray, and either you get what you prayed for, then that is counted as evidence that god listened to the prayer, or you don't get what you prayed for, then that is counted as evidence that god knows better than you. The important point is: No matter what happens, it is counted as evidence for god. But an experiment where the result is counted as evidence for a particular hypothesis, no matter what the result of the experiment is, doesn't actually provide any evidence for anything, because the conclusion from the experiment does not actually depend on the result of the experiment. If you count every possible outcome as evidence for your hypothesis, there is no point in even doing the experiment, the result is the same as if you were to simply come to the conclusion without an experiment. Or in other words: Such a claim is indistinguishable from something that someone just made up.
> What are some claims of science and religion (regarding religion, particularly fundamental ones) that are contradictory, as in they claim opposing things (X and ~X)?
Religion: "It is warranted to believe that a god exists."
Science: "It is not warranted to believe that a god exists."
> A definition you have assumed? Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying anything is wrong with that assumption, it is a self-evident one, but call it like it is.
WTF? Yes, I am assuming a shared definition of every single word that I am using. Are you expecting me to spell that out, as if it could possibly be any different? Yes, I am assuming that you share the definition of "to be", and the definition of "different", and the definition of "yes", and the definition of "definition", and the definition of "to assume", ... seriously?
> 1 ) If X can't be explained, then X is unintelligible. [...]
Did you change anything? This is again treating the explainability as a property of X, which is incoherent nonsense. What we are talking about is that some particular subject/class of subjects possibly won't ever gain certain knowledge. So, a sensible way to express that is something along the lines of "If X will never be understood by humans, then ...". Maybe you could rewrite your argument in those terms?
> To exist and be non-physical is to exist and be incapable of changing state, to exist and be incapable of changing state is to exist and be non-physical.
So, how does that distinguish the physical from the non-physical, when the physical isn't even mentioned?
> Wow have I done a terrible job of separating the conscience act from the external act. To be abundantly clear, it is immoral to violate your conscience. There can be two actions that occur when you perform an action: Choosing an action is itself an action, and performing the chosen action is separate from the choosing of that action. So if I where to correct my comments along these lines I would properly state: "It is immoral to [choose to] do what you think is immoral even if [what you choose to do] is moral, so you'll be better off doing [an action] you think is moral even if [that action] is immoral [because choosing to do otherwise would be immoral].
So, how exactly are you adding anything of substance here? All of those additional words don't do anything about the brokenness of the argument, unless you are saying that it is possible to act in a way that is not in accordance with how you choose to act ... which is just gibberish. The subjective idea of what is moral still fully determines the choice, and unless you can choose to act differently that you choose to act (WTF?), any independent claims about the morality of the action still are as vacuous as they were before.
> You are better off this way because you are not as/(at all) culpable for your actions if you didn't know they were wrong. That being said we are obligated to correct our neighbors' incorrect moral beliefs and to be open to being corrected."
What does that have to do with anything? I thought we were talking about morality, not culpability, nor obligations to neighbors?!
> Do you expect all true claims to sound rational before you've heard their justification? What did you expect given that I haven't been taking any steps to establish them?
No, but I expect that anyone who is serious about a discussion doesn't just suddenly dump on me some outlandish claims with the expectation that I will accept them for the purposes of building arguments on them. It should hardly be a surprise to you that I don't share the assumption that those claims that you were making are true, so it is obviously completely pointless to even mention them if you don't intend to justify them. You might as well just be saying "I am right" ... might be true, but it's obviously guaranteed to be unconvincing.
> "Ad Hominem"
Nope. That simply wasn't an argument at all, just an observation.
> That might be what you'd expect, but if you claim that's the kind of person I am then you'll need to substantiate that claim.
Correct. Which is why I am not making that claim. I am simply telling you that you maybe should check extra carefully whether that is what you are doing. Because I, ultimately, can't.