Doesn’t that same accountability today result in execs selling out the long-term for short-term gains, also for their own benefit at the expense of shareholders?
That's certainly a tricky question which essentially is connected to their "insider information", but the answer certainly doesn't rely on limiting others' ability to sell.
Solutions to that generally involve long-term vesting periods for executive shares, e.g. executives can't sell their shares for some extended period of time that is sufficiently "long-term". If the board really made sure incentives were aligned, ideally it would be some period of years after they left the company, so they could never sell while they were in a position to influence the value of shares.
But again, there is absolutely zero reason that should ever apply to someone without insider information, i.e. investors generally.
Solutions to that generally involve long-term vesting periods for executive shares, e.g. executives can't sell their shares for some extended period of time that is sufficiently "long-term". If the board really made sure incentives were aligned, ideally it would be some period of years after they left the company, so they could never sell while they were in a position to influence the value of shares.
But again, there is absolutely zero reason that should ever apply to someone without insider information, i.e. investors generally.