[cmurf]

>Instead, the MCAS system was poorly designed because of financial pressure to maintain the fiction of a single 737 type rating.

OK but how do we know, how is it demonstrated, that this financial pressure condition has now been mitigated? What is the exact nature of the "fix"? And actually what are all of the closed door conversations, back then and now, about the various possible behaviors for this software routine? How is it they came up with that one? How is it they come up with the new one? And really, why is the first one wrong (aside from the fact there are a bunch of dead people, which is a consequence of the original error)?

And which parts of the design? There are many parts to it. Not all of them are as bad as others.

As a pilot I find it impossible to imagine a closed door room with engineers not computing, let alone not imagining, the potential for this particular failure mode. And if a pilot were present in that closed door session, I find it impossible they would not immediately be bothered by the potential for mistrim at low altitude that would result in too scary a probability of unrecoverability.

It makes me wonder if pilots were even involved at that level of the design and decision making for the feature.

[Animats]

It makes me wonder if pilots were even involved at that level of the design and decision making for the feature.

They were not.[1]

[1] https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeings-own-test-pilots-lacked-...

[cmurf]

I'm aware of this reporting, that's the test pilots. I'm talking about engineers who are pilots, and pilots consulted for the design portion, whether they be in-house, customers, or consultants brought on board.

If you're a food products company, you bring in people to do some kind of product testing to see if they like it or hate it. So far I have yet to read or hear from a pilot who says: Oh this is GREAT idea! Love the entire concept!