[RachelF]

True, it is easy to be wise after the event. However, the management culture at NASA, which was also responsible for the loss of Challenger, and something Richard Feynman also criticized, did not change.

This lead to managers ignoring engineers' warnings about the foam strikes on Columbia, and also rejecting requests for high resolution images.

This is exactly the same culture which ignored engineers' warnings about the O-rings on the SRBs.

Linda Ham, the mission manager who rejected these requests left the space shuttle program after the Columbia disaster and was moved to other positions at NASA. Not firing or disciplining these managers will cause similar disasters in future. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linda_Ham#Columbia_disaster_an...

[TheDong]

> Not firing or disciplining these managers will cause similar disasters in future.

I think the quote is something like "Why would I fire them, we just lost X lives and dollars training them?"

[darkpuma]

That doesn't seem to quite square with them being reassigned. In Ham's particular example:

> "Ham's attitude, and her dismissal of dissenting points of view from engineers, was identified as part of a larger cultural problem at NASA.[2] After the report's release, Ham was demoted and transferred out of her management position in the space shuttle program."

[ovi256]

That's the best option if you want to be able to rebuild confidence in the chain of command. The people who have been ignored before will never trust her again anyway. In such situations, you either rebuild the chain of command or the whole troop if you want to have a functioning group.