| > GK Chesterton makes the good point that rigorous rationalism is only valid if you start from true premises. Rationalism permits us to examine even our premises, so your conclusion doesn't follow. > Hence when rational physicalists try to take their viewpoint to its logical conclusion they must make the incoherent claim, as Daniel Dennett does, that consciousness is an "illusion." Oh boy. > If consciousness is an illusion, then what is having the illusion? The self contradiction is because illusion itself presupposes a consciousness that be deceived. No, the "self-contradiction" is that you seem to think an illusion requires a subject. "What" is having the illusion is the system that mistakenly concludes that its perceptions entail consciousness. Here's a subject-free definition of "illusion" so you don't fall into this trap again: an illusion is a perception that entails an obvious/immediate, but false, conclusion. |