| Film's properties are known and understood and there aren't any "super films" that are better or more capable than another country's. Lenses are also understood. With electro-optical (EO) sensors, great care must be taken to reduce the quality of the final product when it is publicly released so that adversaries do not gain a complete understanding of the what the sensors are capable of. Film creates "better" images, but modern EO sensors are more capable in certain circumstances. There is all kinds of computational and electronic trickery one can do to obtain images that may be impossible to capture on film that you want to keep secret, like fusing short wavelength IR with visible light or using it to discipline visible light to correct or reduce atmospheric distortion. Other EO technologies can determine what an object is made of from great distances. Technologies like that you want to keep secret. In a hypothetical Cuban Missile Crisis set in 2019, US analysts would have visible, near- and short wavelength-infrared, thermal, and pan-chromatic imagery to look at, but the 2019 version of Adlai Stevenson would still only show the visible images at the UN. |
The ability to more easily declassify film stock is due less to the technology and more to the bureaucracy within intel communities. The film stock is owned by a single agency and so the declassification authority is relatively straightforwards. Digital imagery is shared instantly with a host of different agencies, many of whom still do not talk to each other regularly, and is stored in countless archives. Declassifying a digital file is therefore an administrative burden in comparison to a roll of film kept by a specific agency.