[jamesonquinn]

IRV actually has the opposite problem: "If I vote for my ideal candidate, am I impairing the good candidate's chance of winning?" For instance, if it were Nader/Gore/Bush with 26%/25%/49%, and (hypothetically) all Nader voters preferred Gore over Bush but not all Gore voters preferred Nader over Bush, then voting for Nader instead of dishonestly choosing the "lesser evil" Gore would end up electing Bush.

No voting method can entirely escape both of these problems. But newer methods like STAR voting balance them against each other and manage to minimize both.

[flukus]

> No voting method can entirely escape both of these problems. But newer methods like STAR voting balance them against each other and manage to minimize both.

First you need to demonstrate that it's a problem in reality, there are very few times in history where it has been a real issue. Alternative to IRV are usually much more complex which is a terrible tradeoff for an almost entirely imaginary problem. Star voting has the same problem as star rating systems, almost everyone will score either a 5 or a 1.

[szemet]

almost everyone will score either a 5 or a 1

Then it will be similar to approval voting.

Previous comments complained that approval is bad because you cannot express detailed preferences, but you say no one wants to anyway? So then approval is ok?