[VBprogrammer]

> I believe that's correct given that they had an Unreliable Airspeed Indicator warning (due to the malfunctioning AoA sensor), per the memory items on the UAI checklist.

The idea that a pilot would knowingly leave thrust at climb power while in modestly level flight at low altitude and expect not to overspeed is very strange to me, checklist or no checklist.

I think they were too busy fighting the controls to worry about that.

[acqq]

They followed Boeing instructions (provided in the report, Appendix 2, and also here: https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA... ).

Note IAS DISAGREE alert:

"In the event of an uncommanded horizontal stabilizer trim movement, combined with any of the following potential effects or indications resulting from an erroneous Angle of Attack (AOA) input, the flight crew must comply with the Runaway Stabilizer procedure in the Operating Procedures chapter of this manual:

- Continuous or intermittent stick shaker on the affected side only.

- Minimum speed bar (red and black) on the affected side only.

- Increasing nose down control forces.

- IAS DISAGREE alert.

- ALT DISAGREE alert.

- AOA DISAGREE alert (if the option is installed)"

About which was written here:

https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/03/et302-used-the-cut-out-swi...

"the high speeds observed" ... "were logical. It’s a consequence of following the Emergency checklist for “IAS disagree” (IAS is Indicated Airspeed, i.e. the dynamic air pressure experienced by the aircraft) after takeoff."

In short, seeing that Boeing indeed wrote about the IAS alert being activated when the sensor fails, and MCAS gets activated, I can only conclude that Boeing indeed knew that the pilots would make the plane uncontrollable if they followed Boeing's instructions. It seems they just gambled on the chance that the second crash won't happen so soon after the first.

Either that, or we'd have to believe that what a single pilot manage to do for his Youtube video a company which is to deliver the planes in worth of hundreds of billions (!) of USD wasn't able to do.

[wazoox]

Part of the procedure is to keep thrust or augment it, after disengaging auto-throttle. Remember that they were in stall warning, too (stick shaker), which certainly shouldn't incite anyone to throttle down.

[msbarnett]

Setting it to climb is literally a memory item, pictured here: https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/24739/what-is-t.... That’s pitch 5 degrees up, thrust at climb at their altitude.

Why? Because your instruments disagree about your airspeed. You want to have a large margin to keep your speed high enough that you won’t accidentally stall while you try to establish what’s reliable.

[VBprogrammer]

Sure, and you then hold that until the aircraft stalls at 45000ft? Of course not.

You can't point at a memory item and treat it like the pilots can only apply what's in there in exclusion to everything else. The structural limits of the aircraft are there for a reason.

Aside from anything else the pilots were trying to maintain altitude by their communication with ATC.

Not that I'm blaming them. I think they had too much going on to even consider moving the throttles, and thats 100% on Beoing, but it probably didn't help their chances of recovery.