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by rellui
2635 days ago
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From the way you describe it, if the stabilizer reaches the point where human force is insufficient to bring it back then they're toast since MCAS is tied into the electronic stabilizer. How did this scenario get missed during testing? You'd think they would do extra testing around the new changes. |
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Seems like systemic issues. Reportedly Boeing's submitted risk assessment of the MCAS was based on a single adjustment applied from it, not repeated cycles of application based on a failure of the AoA to recover to what it saw as "level".
The FSB noted the change to the cutout configuration as a difference, but didn't analyze how that could change anything during Autopilot or Speed Trim runaway situations. They didn't even make any note of the MCAS as a difference at all (possibly they were not informed of it?).
I suspect this all comes down to the fact that Boeing started with a conclusion -- The MAX series must not require new simulator time -- and that conclusion was the lens through which they analyzed (or didn't) everything else.