[Aser]

The pilots were trained on how to deal with a runaway trim stabiliser. The procedure hasn't changed from the old 737, the only thing that has changed is that it is that the failure mode is more likely to occurr on the 737 MAX.

From the article: “A properly trained pilot should be able to solve an MCAS anomaly or any uncommanded flight-control input through procedures that are taught to all 737 pilots,” said Menza, noting that the emergency information Boeing distributed in December reiterated those procedures.

Here's a video of a competent 737 pilot showing those exact procedures: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xixM_cwSLcQ

Obviously the MCAS system is badly designed, but any automation system can fail and pilots need to know how to deal with it.

[bushido]

Per initial reports the black box data suggests that the procedure was followed, but the MCAS was re-engaged, looks like investigations are ongoing if the MCAS can re-engage automatically or if the trim was too hard to manually override and re-engaged by the pilots to be able to use the electric trim to level the plane.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ethiopian-airlines-pilots-initi...

[phire]

That actually raised more questions than it answers.

Did the pilots fail to notice the MCAS problem before it put the plane too far out of trim?

Could they have saved the plane if they stuck to the procedure and kept adjusting the trim by hand?

Why does MCAS override even direct pilot trim up commands?

Is the runway trim procedure even viable on older 737s once the trim goes past a certain point? Or are we just lucky that it never happens?

[cjbprime]

It doesn't present as runaway trim, though. It's a small change in the trim, repeated every few seconds, which can be counteracted on the control column but will eventually add up. Small trim changes are usually happening all the time.

[alistairSH]

This is my understanding.

In a typical run-away trim, the trim wheel will move a great distance. It's very noticeable, both audibly (the wheel makes a clack-clack-clack noise) and visibly (there are white paint flashes on the wheel). And, obviously, the plane nose goes up or down by more than expected. The correct remedy is to disable the auto trim control via switches on the panel (located near the trim wheels).

The MCAS will adjust the trim in small increments every 10 (or is it 20?) seconds. Yes, a pilot should notice this, but because it's intermittent, it's more likely they don't "see" it as run-away trim, and just a slightly abnormal trim (EDIT - problem made worse because pilots were not informed MCAS existed - it's not a failure more they have trained on). They may attempt to remedy this with the manual trim control (a rocker switch on the control yoke). This does NOT disable MCAS, it only re-trim the plane. MCAS will re-engage due to faulty AoA sensors repeatedly until either the pilot disables all auto-trim with the switch on the panel OR the plane runs into the ground.

[cjbprime]

Yeah. I'm also not clear on the practicality of retrimming the aircraft at low altitude (Ethiopian was never >1000ft above ground) before impacting terrain after you disable the trim motor. You have to use a hand crank, because you just killed the trim motor altogether, and I think it takes several minutes (!) of cranking to get the jackscrew from one end to the other.

I wonder if they killed the trim motor and then failed to reach level flight before the ground got in the way.

[cmurf]

Fatigue as well. Looking at the flight track after the last and final nose down, it's they were overcome. Nose down -> more speed -> more stabilizer nose down force -> more nose down attitude even without a change in stabilizer -> more speed -> more stabilizer force -> more nose down attitude.

And then the ground got in the way.