[apocalypstyx]

This was claimed long before Pinker. But the general proposition brings with it one huge (moral? / ethical?) problem: at its heart its the argument that feeling sad for fictitious entities helps us to in some way interface better with non-fictitious entities. Terry Eagleton argues against the idea of considering fictitious people as in any way relating to real people, but I think he's wrong. The argument needs to be expanded and reversed. In reality, we regard all or almost all) other entities as fictitious. So in this way such a Humanities / Pinker argument but correct in the sense that we are as much inventing entities. However, then, a potential (moral? / ethical?) dilemma arises in that we will then expose this conceptualization on these entities to whatever degree is possible, giving us a panoply of common cultural practices such as --- but not limited to --- the attempted elimination of homosexuality, the confinement of women to the home, etc. So that which claims to liberate instead provides a superstructure for oppression.

[krapp]

The human brain seems not to experience or process reality so much as simulate it, since we know there are myriad ways that memories and perception don't match literal reality. I wouldn't doubt that deep, deep down at whatever amounts to the "bare metal" there isn't a recognized distinction between "fictional" and "real" entities, or even between those and the self.

Perhaps only at higher levels of abstraction that these distinctions are meaningful.