| I'm not so sure about the "hidden debt" story. I have a feeling that that's a story popularized by people who want to believe that everything done under the Nazi regime was bad. The truth is that the rise of authoritarian extremism tends to be facilitated by economic uncertainty (yes, racism and xenophobia tends to play a big role as well, but immigration is always easier to stomach when jobs are plenty etc.). Staving off anti-democratic forces should take precedence over almost everything else, and it certainly should take precedence over economic orthodoxy. If that means learning from a Nazi supporter (who wasn't a Nazi himself), then so be it. So rather than hand-waving about "hidden debt", it would be important to explain the actual transmission mechanisms through which Schacht's policies would eventually have caused problems if the war hadn't happened. It's unclear whether you would truly be able to do so. As the article explains, Schacht used some clever techniques both domestically (shifting investment from private to public sectors, basically) and externally (the aski accounts) that would seem to put a limit on the effects that the debt could have. Those policies are against the tastes of the economic orthodoxy, and a lot of the "wisdom" of economic orthodoxy is stated with the hidden assumption that such policies aren't used. So any blanket statement about the dangers of debt made by this orthodoxy are quite suspect and probably do not apply. At the very least, you need to look at the details to consider whether they apply. |
The nazis used most of that money to build their army. If they hadn't used that army, it would have been wasted money, which in no way could have repaid the debt.
Democratic governments can - and should - borrow to invest if they see an opportunity for future growth. But you can't create those opportunities out of thin air.