| Here's the official report: https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elyextendttnews/annexe.01_04... Page 28: The right-seat co-pilot Bonin says "j’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou non qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ? "(I feel like we're speeding like crazy, what do you think?") Page 31: Same co-pilot "mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure " (But I've pulling back completely for a while), and this while the cockpit is screaming "Dual Input" (so this means that the other pilot was inputting as well, thus "unbeknownst" in my original comment). Same page, right after, the captain says, "non non non ne remonte plus là" (No, no, no, don't pull back any further". If you read the entire transcript, it's clear that there was persistent confusion as to who was in control, despite the dual-input warnings. AF447 is widely considered to be a failure in CRM, and a failure to recognize that they were in an aerodynamic stall (again, despite the warnings). They didn't trust the plane with the information it was providing, which is probably why they ignored these warnings. |
Perhaps you didn't notice this, but immediately after the point in the transcript you refer to, there's an exchange between the pilots where they establish who's in control (see "vas-y tu as les commandes" at 2 h 13 min 46,0). There is no way to be sure, but it seems probable that this exchange was prompted by the dual input warnings.
>They didn't trust the plane with the information it was providing, which is probably why they ignored these warnings.
There is no indication that they ignored the dual input warnings.
Linking the control sticks doesn't magically resolve problems caused by a breakdown in cockpit discipline. If both pilots are going for the controls at the same time, you're going to have problems. The warning system seems to have done its job, insofar as it prompted the pilots to figure out who was in control.