Yes. The ratcheting sound is deliberate, so the pilots don't need to see the wheels spin to know the trim is running. Also note that there's a white stripe on the wheel so it's easy to see it is running.
You'll note in that video, the left-hand pilot has a headset on, presumably the right-hand pilot does too. Headsets are seen in other videos [1] of the cockpit.
So even if the spinning trim wheels make noise, they may not have heard it.
(My google image search shows some pilots wearing two-ear headsets, some wearing one-ear headsets, some wearing two-ear headsets with side not on their ear, and some not wearing headsets. But some of those are pilots posing for photos, and presumably pilots don't let people visit the cockpit during critical stages of the flight)
I don't understand do you think they're listening to music or something?
Having a headset on doesn't stop you hearing noises in a cockpit. How did you think all the other verbal alarms and callouts worked if they can't hear anything?
If the deliberate clack of the trim wheel also goes into the headphones then why are we having a discussion about whether headphones stopped them hearing the deliberate clack of the trimwheel?
Noise cancelling headphones would still let you something clicking right in front of you. In fact, open-back noise cancelling headphones would be better to wear than something that just muffles the noise if you need to hear your environment but just want to cut out the hum of the engines.
I'd imagine that that would be less common (or at least, they would use headphones with a lesser effect) with commercial jets. They're far enough from the engines that the noise should be pretty tollerable.
Exactly. It was not "runaway" in the sense of "continuously doing the same." Something was happening, from the point of view of the pilot and co-pilot "at random." (Not to mention that on the previous models exactly such pattern was effectively impossible to happen). The faulty non-redundant sensor was producing false reading and that was the input to the to the pilots completely unknown MCAS which then moved the nose down based on the difference between the input and MCAS' expected target, turning "the correction" on only from time to time.
The presence of the third, off-duty pilot on the flight before additionally explains even better how in that case the crash was avoided. While the pilot and co-pilot were at the controls, the third one, looking from behind, didn't have the direct duties to do, so he had enough time to both just observe everything that was going on and the less immediate stress to allow him to come to the solution that worked.
Like when one programmer spends half an hour on something "not working" and complains to the colleague who just takes a look and immediately sees what the first one hasn't for half an hour. Additionally the movement of the trim wheel is actually easier to follow from the place in the back (see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19440045 ).
And there's also a possibility that the false sensor reading and MCAS together produced a slightly different differential signal which resulted in more obvious manifestation of the problem. Possibly both elements contributed to the lucky outcome in that previous flight.
In the old times of civil aviation there was the third person on duty in the cockpit, the "flight-engineer." As the planes got more computerized controls, they started to be certified to fly with two-pilot crews. The computerized systems, when working, do reduce the chance of the crash and overall number of accidents did decrease simply because the humans were on the average less often in control, and therefore there was less chance to do anything wrong.
The problem is when the unreported computerized controls secretly depend on the single sensor that can be faulty. And when they actively confuse the pilot and ruin the flight instead of helping him.