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by geofft
2655 days ago
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And my claim is that if your threat model depends on an attacker who can afford $20M being unable to afford $40M, your threat model is flawed and you've already lost. They might have to seek alternative options. They might not. They might just be able to issue $20M of bonds, who knows. They might have a strong economy next year and the attackerbucks-to-USD exchange rate might double. If you need to defend against an attacker with $30M in the bank, make the attack cost $30B or $30T. And the neat thing about crypto is that's easy to do: just increase the amount of entropy involved. A mere ten more bits make a brute-force attack cost 1000x as much. If we're genuinely worried that 63 bits is too small, ditch the 64-bit requirement and make it 128-bit. (Probably phrase it as 120-bit, so people can use UUIDs and whatnot - the point is still that 120 is still clearly more than enough, not near the borderline.) |
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But is it? I think the underlying claim is that 2X difference doesn't matter, which is patently false.