[thebaer]

Yep, we're already maintaining a quarterly warrant canary for this reason [0]. Still, this report will cover all the other cases that don't involve an NSL -- the vast majority of requests, I'd imagine.

[0] https://write.as/canary.txt

[willio58]

I like the simplicity of a warrant canary. Such a great way to stick it to the government, I love it.

[WrtCdEvrydy]

I wonder if issuing a canary after being NSL'd would count as disclosing...

Make a public post about your new monthly canary and forget to add that you didn't get NSLd...

[nickpsecurity]

"I wonder if issuing a canary after being NSL'd would count as disclosing..."

Almost certainly is what I've thought up till now. They get a warrant they're not supposed to disclose. They disclose it indirectly via the warrant canary. The Feds and judges aren't too happy with the "smartass" move. They punish them.

Alternatively, two things might happen:

1. They let them expire the warrant canary since lots of places take them down periodically with no effect that I see. Some paranoid folks might stop using the service but many targets will probably use it. There's also a potential delay between paranoid folks noticing no update and info handed over.

2. They might be ordered to continue updating the warrant canary as if nothing happened to maintain secrecy. If they balk, the Feds would likely argue to the judge it was specifically meant to obstruct justice by defeating "lawful, secrecy orders" or some other wording. Judge might agree. In Lavabit case, the argument judge was going with was that Levison could just not tell his customers they had the keys with no negative impact on his business. So, forcing lies is something with precedent.