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Thank you for adding this! Still, it is not so straight-forward to conclude, from just the premise that the system is effectively axiomatized (i.e., its theorems are recursively enumerable), that "does s prove S" is a recursive property. In my opinion, if the assumption is that "proofs are computer checkable" (i.e., "does s prove S" is a recursive property, which is what is required in the paper), then it would be good to either state that as the key assumption, or state for example that this follows via Craig's theorem from the assumption that the system is effectively axiomatized: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Craig%27s_theorem Interestingly, from this theorem it follows that such a system can be re-axiomatized so that "S is a theorem" is even a primitive recursive property. In fact, when Gödel wrote "rekursiv" around 1930, he meant the class of functions that we now call primitive recursive. Because of Craig's theorem, we know that primitive recursive, recursive, and recursively enumerable can be used interchangeably in the definition of effective axiomatization, but without such a theorem, it would be a leap to conclude one from the other. |
Also, the Wikipedia article doesn't say that Craig's Theorem proves recursively enumerable axiomatizations equivalent to (primitive) recursive axiomatizations. I would find it very surprising if this was a consequence. It only says that a recursively enumerable set of formulas (e.g. the provable sentences in Peano arithmetic, not merely its axioms) can be given a (primitive) recursive axiomatization. That's a very much weaker claim.