[codetrotter]

> The rationale for creating this model is the lack of up-to-date electric grid location data

Certain details about the electrical grid are regarded as a matter of national security in Norway and I would think most other developed countries share this view.

For example, if the exact location of all transmission lines in a country are known to the public then an enemy state or a group of terrorists could use that knowledge to completely cut the power to a city as part of their attack.

The willingness of some to attack the power grid of someone else was demonstrated for example in the December 2015 Ukraine power grid cyberattack.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/December_2015_Ukraine_power_gr...

[PopularCopula]

This is correct. I work in this field and the grid model is always treated as highly confidential. You can find some models online for some power systems, but often these are simplified or slightly altered to make it no longer representative actual system.

At most with the approach used in the article, you would be able to identify some radially connected regions, or poorly connected areas, but nothing that is a national security risk. To be able to maliciously attack such a system efficiently you'd need an idea of instantaneous flow, component limits, substation topologies and any available mitigating actions.

I don't mean to create the illusion that power systems are impervious to attack. They aren't, and can actually be quite fragile if attacked at the right place and right time. Thankfully the 'arms race' is cyber and not physical. It is easy for grid companies to share best practice on cyber defense, but physical defense and mitigation is very system specific. It is also hard/expensive to defend infrastructure that spans your country or even beyond your border. The Metcalf Sniper Attack is a good example of such a 'difficult to defend against' problem. To perform such an attack you'd need more than a connectivity model.

[JorgeGT]

Makes sense, I've seen mostly only high-voltage maps, not MV. Cool examples [warning, big PDFs!] include:

* Continental europe: https://docstore.entsoe.eu/Documents/Publications/maps/2018/...

* Spain: https://www.ree.es/sites/default/files/01_ACTIVIDADES/Docume...

[corint]

What prevents those details from being mapped by volunteers though? Consider openinframap, for most western nations that looks to be pretty spot on?

[bdamm]

Nothing, but some of the details are not available to volunteers. Even if you know where all the lines are, it may not be clear how to attack those lines. There are redundancies and branch switches and feeder cross connections. If you knew where all the switches and cross connections were, though, then you could really take advantage of any weaknesses in coverage.