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by danielvf
2696 days ago
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There's something called the "Swiss Cheese Theory" of accidents. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model) In a mostly-robust system, different layers catch and defend against the errors of other layers in the system. For a major accident to occur, holes in multiple layers have to line up that day. In this case we have four holes that lined up that day - a plane model with a possible rare software bug, an aircraft with a faulty sensor feeding bad information to the computers, an airline company with internal culture that continues to fly a specific aircraft that keeps trying to point at the ground, sometimes without even making an attempt at fixing the problem, and finally, on this fatal day, a crew that did not follow the proper procedures even after twenty-three nose down incidents during the flight. Even without the MACS system present, the last two holes seem like they would bring down an airliner eventually, from one cause or another. Pilots are rightfully mad about not being told about the MACS system. But it's just one of many systems on a 737 that can trim the stabilizer to point that it can't be flow. That's why the procedure for any stabilizer problem is to disable automatic control of the stabilizer. The training and checklists that the accident pilots had covered this, and previous pilots flying the accident aircraft did this and then had uneventful flights. |
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By the way - in small airplanes, you can overcome trim with elevator pressure. That's not necessarily the case on a passenger jet; and not only because it's much bigger, but because the trim works differently [1]. I wonder whether that played a role. I must admit that before I read [1], I had assumed that bad trim is something I can overpower, when push comes to shove.
[1] https://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2627.pdf