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I didn't know I was being interrogated about Riak failure modes. Ok, here's more verbiage on Riak failures.

First off, SAN was one of three different disk storage solutions. When you work for <BIG CORP>, the lowly product teams don't always get to pick and choose what infrastructure is available. They have to do the best they can with what they have, when they don't get what they ask for. If <BIG CORP> says to use a shitty openstack cluster, that's what you have to deal with, and you have to beg for all the ephemeral SSDs you can get. (Which then becomes a huge pain in the ass when you need to scale storage and your choice is (A) buy more machines and migrate nodes so you can upgrade ephemeral on the old machines or (B) start swapping disks in running hypervisors and cry yourself to sleep, or (C) use SAS or other array/volume on a SAN)

And thanks for blithely ignoring what I'm saying. Riak did have corruption bugs that should have been preventable - as I said, a major source of the problems was LevelDB, and Riak's own documentation shows this to be true.

You could look sideways at these things and the db would corrupt. A node with ephemeral storage, with no detectable errors on it whatsoever, would suddenly stop working. We would go look at it, and it had a single leveldb file corrupt... and nothing else wrong with it at all. Not only would it corrupt, it wouldn't make any attempt to fix itself, even though there was a documented fix.

Riak has anti-entropy intended to detect missing data and fix it, but it's the erlang equivalent of cron jobs and hash trees. The whole thing is designed to just go "dum de dum, I wonder if anything's broken after $INTERVAL?" and then perform some operation, which if the cluster is under load, may kick it over. So they added throttling (throttling is everywhere in Riak, as instead of simply rejecting operations because it's unsafe, they'd rather make everything go r e a l l y s l o w).

There was very little intelligence or event-driven programming for failure detection and remediation. When the db corrupted in a way that wasn't handled by anti-entropy, the node would just die, and we had to manually intervene (later by writing automation to intervene) rather than it, you know, just doing its own automation to fix the corruption. The AAE trees rebuild every $INTERVAL and there's no way to change when or how they rebuild other than to change the $INTERVAL, so there's no way to, for example, force them to rebuild when it is convenient based on lulls in application use.

Then there's Riak search, which has the nice habit of taking down your cluster due to god knows what (memory bloating, cpu starvation, unknown bugs in error logs, etc). Don't use Riak search.

Replication was also a joke. Any network interruption (hello, distributed apps have network interuptions) would kill replication. We would have to detect replication had failed and queues were filling up, and re-start the replication until queues fell. But sometimes replication couldn't resume, because there were 1 of 1,000 different potential failure modes happening with 1 node in a remote cluster somewhere. So we had to resolve that node's issue and get the whole remote cluster healed before the replication queues filled up. If we didn't do that, we'd have to do a full-transfer to prevent potential data loss, which would take days.

We developed auto-healing scripts to deal with most of these situations, and the controls Riak added to slow down processing so it didn't kill the cluster from all the competing operations it was trying to do at once (kv processing, replication, hash regeneration, etc) were not enough for our automation to be able to efficiently control the nodes when they were unhealthy. Riak would just occasionally perform incredibly poor, or nodes would die randomly, and we'd get some unknown errors we couldn't diagnose. All our monitoring and investigation showed nothing wrong with the host - no resource starvation, no error messages, no spikes of client traffic. Riak was just having a bad day, and us being a very small team of not-erlang-programmers, had to just restart shit until it got better, and research fixes once things improved. Our postmortem incident queue was rather large.

This is a small sampling of production Riak issues. I'm not going to dig into my brain for every bug they have, but suffice to say that a distributed database should be able to recover from a single file corruption, and should be able to resist it from ever happening through various techniques that are 20+ years old. Their code is just lame, and proof that just because you write something in Erlang doesn't mean it's going to be stable. And in Riak's defense, the reason why their code was lame was because they were a small company trying to juggle a lot of demanding engineering issues from different customers, and they didn't have much money or time. But lame code is still lame code.