[CorvusCrypto]

Same goes for any signed token scheme. You can still revoke JWTs if you give them an ID and keep a revoke list somewhere. Though as you said most use these to avoid datastore lookups. It's a trade off. Either time-limit signed tokens that can't be revoked with benefit of no lookups or implement revokation.

[geezerjay]

> You can still revoke JWTs if you give them an ID and keep a revoke list somewhere.

You don't need the ID. You can simply store the token's signature. In fact, some implementations store the whole JWT to avoid roundtrips to the auth service, and revoking the token is just a matter of flipping an attribute in the database.

[jondubois]

This kind of comment might make one wonder why not just use a sessionId to begin with but JWT in this case is still useful in a microservice arch because a token which has been revoked from one high security microservice may still be valid for lower security microservices: It gives each microservice the option of deciding what kind of security they need to provide... They may not need any revocation list; maybe the JWT on its own is sufficient; they just keep accepting the token until it expires naturally.

The token expiry determines the baseline accuracy of banning across all services.

[geezerjay]

> This kind of comment might make one wonder why not just use a sessionId to begin with

JWT and sessionIds are totally different beasts. JWT are used per request, are designed to expire and be refreshed, are specific to each individual endpoint and store authorization info in a specialized third party service.

[jakelazaroff]

"No revocation" is a dangerous constraint to have in an authentication session. What happens if a user's token is compromised? You have to either wait for the token to expire (if you implemented expiry) or log out every single user.

[CorvusCrypto]

That's exactly the trade-off. I'm not going to say it's a big enough negative to dismiss using the stateless signed token scheme because it depends on the needs of the application.

But either way, if you really can't afford a database or cache layer lookup to see if a token is still valid, then you accept that by using a bearer token, that is only validated by signature alone, that it is possible a user will have their session hijacked without possibility of revokation.

The usual way this is mitigated is by use of a small expiry time (I've commonly seen <=5 min) and a revokable refresh token. This still gives a hijacker a possible 5 minutes (assuming 5 minute expiry) if a user revoked the refresh token, but it does mitigate the damage while still reducing DB lookups since you only do a lookup in token refresh. Hope that clears things up. Again your application needs should drive these decisions.

[tyldum]

Indeed. However, this is just a building block and not a library solution. Combined with a revocation list you are good. And use something like OpenPolicyAgent to implement it, adding a lot of other possibilities as well.