| Realistically, I don't think the majority of the Australian community is particularly aware of, let alone opposed to this legislation. The idea that law enforcement should be able to gain access to encrypted communications if they have a warrant doesn't seem particularly controversial in the wider community either. Given this, I'd assume the law is here to stay. The question we need to ask is how can we constructively engage politicians to minimise the flaws in the law. On that front Labor has been much more open and were instrumental in addressing some of the deeper flaws in the original legislation. So to be clear: 1. The law specifically forbids the government requiring weakening of encryption / authentication / authorisation mechanisms. 2. The law specifically forbids the government requiring systemic vulnerabilities be introduced. 3. The law defines a consultation, review and appeal process. 4. The law prevents the government requiring someone commit a crime in a foreign jurisdiction 5. The law allows publishing the number of aggregate TAN/TCN/TAR received in aggregate in a 6 month period. The question is where should the law be fixed and how do we engage Labor / Liberals to fix those aspects. Personally I would like to see: 1. Better protection for software exported for use outside Australia 2. Better definition of what defines a 'systemic' vulnerability 3. Greater protection for individuals. For if a TCN/TAN could be otherwise issued to a company, then the law should not allow a notice to be issued to an individual. |