[cthalupa]

Because the free will either exists or does not, and that existence requires it be compatible with the rules that govern how our universe exists. If it's not compatible with how the universe works, it doesn't exist.

There is no such proof, and as such, the null hypothesis or null assumption is that free will doesn't exist, in the same way we assume the angular momentum of the universe is zero.

I'm not arguing about whether or not that's what Compatibilism believes, I'm arguing that Compatibilism is wrong because you cannot separate the way humans act and think from the physical laws of the universe. Regardless of whether or not most humans act in a way that is compatible with Compatibilism doesn't prove Compatibilism, especially if Compatibilism basically agrees with all of the physics that say free will likely doesn't exist, and then does a philosophical shoulder shrug and says that free will exists anyway, because we have freedom to act, despite that not being nearly enough to encompass actual free will.

[posterboy]

> Because the free will either exists or does not, and that existence requires it be compatible with the rules that govern how our universe exists. If it's not compatible with how the universe works, it doesn't exist.

I very much agree but have to conceed that your view on the label 'universe' might be too narrow. I too vigourisly oppose to the notion that the philosophical question of free will is not about how the universe works. Because will is all about how I will work the universe.

I suppose meeting somewhere halfway would be compromise, and naasking was just teasing with a reductio ad absurdum thought experiment.

[naasking]

> Because the free will either exists or does not, and that existence requires it be compatible with the rules that govern how our universe exists. If it's not compatible with how the universe works, it doesn't exist.

Agreed.

> There is no such proof, and as such, the null hypothesis or null assumption is that free will doesn't exist

1. This is a misapplication of the null hypothesis. There are good reasons why angular momentum should be zero and that's why that would be the null hypothesis. If I were to accept that a null hypothesis is sensible in this scenario, then the opposite is the case here: we directly observe us making choices free from coercion and are good at inferring and understanding other people's choices with or without coercion; we use terms like "free will" and are able to communicate precisely what this means to others, and they easily understand our meaning. The null hypothesis is then that we do have free will and a test must be devised to disprove this (some might argue that something like the MRI tests that detect decisions before we're consciously aware of them would qualify).

2. Compatibilism doesn't require such low-level physics considerations. It depends only on intelligent agents acting on reasons, a category under which humans fall, and that is proof that Compatibilist free will exists. You can dispute whether this should qualify as "proper" free will, the type of free will that grounds moral responsibility and matches our moral language and moral reasoning, but you cannot deny that Compatibilist free will itself exists. I have further provided considerable evidence that Compatibilist free will does in fact explain our moral language and reasoning and does ground moral responsibility, therefore there is no reason not to accept Compatibilism as "proper" free will.

In both cases, your burden of proof has been met and exceeded.

> I'm not arguing about whether or not that's what Compatibilism believes, I'm arguing that Compatibilism is wrong because you cannot separate the way humans act and think from the physical laws of the universe.

Compatibilism doesn't require you to.

> and then does a philosophical shoulder shrug and says that free will exists anyway, because we have freedom to act, despite that not being nearly enough to encompass actual free will.

Physics says that day jobs don't actually exist. There is nowhere in the fundamental physics ontology for a location in spacetime where certain aggregates of matter must go for 8 hours a day from 9AM to 5PM on week days.

And yet, by and large we all have such a day job. Do you agree? Is it a philsophical shoulder shrug to say that day jobs don't exist, but then say day jobs kinda do exist because I quite clearly go to a day job every week day?

So either the distinction you're making exists but doesn't matter, or it doesn't exist and you're simply making a category error, confusing two phenomena which have no direct relation to each other.