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by nardi 2757 days ago
You seem to be saying that only explanations that rely solely on the physical world are valid or worthwhile. But when doing philosophy, it would be hasty to say that only empirical facts are knowable.
2 comments

I' not really saying anything about non-empirical facts. I'm open to the principle they might be knowable. I tend to thin they must be encoded physically in order to affect us in any way. How does a non-physical thing with no representation in the physical world have a physical effect?

That aside, I'm saying that I don't see how non-physicality solves the problem of free will. In a physicalist interpretation decisions can be influenced by internal state, influenced randomly, or influenced by external forces. Non-empirical facts are still state. What additional factor does non-physicality contribute that I didn't list?

Is a 'soul' part of the person or external? Does it have state? Does it contribute randomness? What is it that it actually does except add something else we have to ask these questions about?

I'm of the mind that soul involves the encoding in DNA and the magnetic fields generated and sensed by the electrical systems of the body.

When you have a group of people "gathered together" ("In my name") there surely must be a subtle but coherent magnetic field that interacts with the physical to bring about "unexplainable phenomena". Perhaps the notion of God/gods could be explained this way.

Indo-european rune technology involves subtle magnetic fields in complex shapes, and are believed to affect the physical in "non-deterministic" ways as well. [1]

1. "Runelore" by Edred Thorsson

> But when doing philosophy, it would be hasty to say that only empirical facts are knowable.

Only if you want to stay with reality not venture into phantasy.

I don't think it's fantasy. There are some reasonable arguments on that side. Even though I'm not entirely convinced on them I've got an open mind on that point. I just don't think it makes any difference to the question of free will though, at least I've not yet seen a coherent argument to that effect.