[fsloth]

I take the computational approach. Even if a system was computable in a finite time, if that time is too long, then effectively for all practical purposes the system is computationally intractable.

I find even the idea that we could one day compute the human brain completely preposterous. We can't even compute water flowing in a pipe today (I'm saying this as an effective non-expert who has dabbled a bit in computational physics).

So, if the philosophical basis is that "if we can deterministically compute something, it's deterministic" then human cognition at the moment is most indeterminate.

Free will or no free will, we really can't know the difference. So it's best to behave like you have a free will, and own your own actions as far as you can.

This is a slight modification to Pascal's gamble :)

[cthalupa]

Sorry, I think I must have written this in such a way that some people are mistaking my point. I'll try to clarify. :)

>So, if the philosophical basis is that "if we can deterministically compute something, it's deterministic" then human cognition at the moment is most indeterminate.

My belief, based on my understanding of physics, is that human cognition is deterministic, regardless of whether or not we can compute it.

But I do largely agree with your broader point that whether or not we have free will should have little impact on the inputs in our system. Even if I believe that everything is deterministic and we have no free will, I can't use that information in any practical way, and human cognition (or perhaps more accurately modern Westerner cognition) is slanted towards believing in something resembling what we call free will. No reason to worry about it for anything beyond philosophical discussions. I brought up the computation as a hypothetical point at which acting differently would matter.

[naasking]

> So, if the philosophical basis is that "if we can deterministically compute something, it's deterministic" then human cognition at the moment is most indeterminate.

I think computational complexity is important, but I also think it's important not to conflate "unpredictable" with "indeterminate", even if they are behaviourally indistinguishable.

> Free will or no free will, we really can't know the difference. So it's best to behave like you have a free will, and own your own actions as far as you can.

Dennett calls this the "intentional stance", ie. that any system of sufficient complexity should be treated as if it were acting with intent.