[dtujmer]

I think Sam Harris put it like this: for free will, it doesn't even matter if reality is deterministic or random because the determinism or randomness are found at the quantum level, many levels "below" neurological free will.

Let's say we have Universe 1 (deterministic) and Universe 2 (random). You face a choice - raise your left hand or your right hand. In U1, if you went back in time several times, you would always pick the same hand because the configuration of matter in the universe would "require" that the next step, globally, is you raising that same hand. In U2, if you went back in time, there could be some variance - maybe you'd pick the other hand 50% of the time - but this variance would happen on a quantum level and only manifest neurologically/physically. I still see no possibility of the classical idea of free will there.

[jgh]

wasnt there a story linked here a couple weeks ago about neurons possibly having some sensitivity to quantum interactions? Wouldn't that mean that the quantum level is not actually below neurological free will?

[naasking]

> I still see no possibility of the classical idea of free will there.

That's because you're mistaken that the classical version of free will requires the ability to do otherwise in the sense of making different choices after rewinding time.

Consider what that actually means: an outcome that is different every time you sample it, even going back in time, is classified as a random phenomena. That's not what free will means, classically. Where is the will if your choices are random?

Furthermore, the Frankfurt cases debunked this old notion of the principle of alternate possibilities back in the 60s. Sam Harris is simply mistaken about the applicability of this principle.