| I think the Assange/wikileaks indictment is a misstep by the justice department/current administration. My understanding is that it's far from clear how a case again Assange/wikileaks would play out in court. Like the article mentions, the New York Times and others have published classified information repeatedly -- how can Assange be indicted but not the NYT? Assange also isn't an American citizen and he hasn't leaked information himself, just published it. I think there's a good chance Assange would be acquitted. I also think it's a bizarre exagerration to argue that an attempted prosecution of Assage would result in "broad new powers to put Trump’s media 'enemies' in jail". Don't get me wrong -- I don't much care for Assange. It seems to me that there's a lot of hot air coming from him and he appears to have quite an ego. Also, though I understand there is disagreement about this, I think countries keep secrets for a reason and I consider it naive utopianism to expect everything to be brought into the open. In an ideal world, sure, but the world is not ideal. While I don't think Assange/wikileaks are necessarily "siding with Russia," I do think that Russia has made use of wikileaks. Wikileaks is heavily promoted in Russian propaganda, and it seems at least plausible that Russia could obtain information and leak it through wikileaks. This is a problem for wikileaks: if you're all about freedom of information and you make public everything passed onto you, it's totally possible for state actors -- the same state actors whose behavior you find reprehensible -- to use you as a tool to further their own interests. |
The article obliquely addresses this concern:
> Ronald Reagan’s executive secretary for the National Security Council, Rodney McDaniel, estimated that 90 percent of what was classified didn’t need to be. The head of the 9/11 commission put the number at 75 percent.
> This created a huge amount of tension between so-called “real secrets” — things that really should never be made public, like military positions and the designs of mass-destruction weapons — and things that are merely extremely embarrassing to people in power and should come out. The bombing of civilian targets in Iraq was one example. The mistreatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay was another.
While I'm sure that advocates of naively utopian absolute transparency do exist, a much stronger position is that perfectly legitimate reasons of security have been abused to protect bad actors in power. It's a lot easier to argue against leakers and for the necessity of classified information when the system for designating state secrets doesn't conspicuously lack integrity. Rather than "no secrets ever", the argument posits the necessity of leakers in an environment where the majority of secret info should not be secret.