[SilasX]

But what is “these” and why would the same points not apply?

The fewer people that are suffering a given disease, the lower return to curing it. Moralizing doesn’t change that; it just means you’re willing to prioritize it over cures that help more people.

Yes, creation of disease cures is a tragedy of the commons, but the point is that there are worse tragedies of the commons. What consistent, defensible decision procedure favors a different response to this one?

[ericflo]

It seems we agree in principle on tragedies of commons - that in edge cases where normal rules of economics produce lethal externalities, we should intervene.

My original comment was simply pointing out that it is not inconsistent to blame the system for these lethal externalities.

Where and how we draw the lines on where to break from economic decisionmaking and into moral decisionmaking is a way, way bigger topic.

[SilasX]

I'm sorry, but no, you don't have a basis for concluding that from my responses or the thread.

In my previous comment, I just explained to you why -- even accepting that there are these disease victims you want to care for -- you still wouldn't necessarily have a justification for allocating resources toward a cure for this disease. After all, there are far worse tragedies of the commons: diseases that affect far more people, and that even European governments believe merit a higher priority.

To wave a wand and say "oh, we should throw money at this rare disease", you're saying "we should throw less money at the things that are impacting far more people". (Or, worse, you're saying we should throw unbounded money at all problems, the very charge I originally made!)

And you still haven't even explained under what criteria you would do anything differently, let alone why those criteria would be any better.

So no, you don't get to claim a moral high ground, or that "economic thinking" led to the wrong decision. Not when you can't even explain what exactly the moral error is, or why.