> the only difference between lying and knowingly misleading the point in time of the subject in question?
If I say “this stock will rise in value” and then it doesn’t, that isn’t lying. If I say that while knowing the CEO is committing felonies, it still wouldn’t be lying, but it would be problematic. If I say “this is a share of Apple” when it’s actually Twitter, that’s lying. Bad forecasts aren’t lies, they’re mistakes.
The rating agencies’ role in the crisis is interesting and nuanced, and it is difficult to fault anyone other than the investors who over-relied on (and arguably misinterpreted) their guidance.
If you look at every security the agencies rated AAA, they performed as expected in cash flows. The underlying mortgages were mostly garbage, but some kept paying. That meant the top tranche of those structures, the tranches that got a high rating, kept paying.
If you held to maturity, the securities performed as promised. (Cf: if the government hadn’t bailed out AIG, they may not have.) The problem was they crashed in value in the interim because people began doubting if they would perform. That was a problem for liquidity-constrained investors, which was almost everyone in 2008. Rating agencies don’t say “this bond won’t trade at 50¢ on the dollar.” They say “this bond will probably pay you back.” And in the latter assessment, they were surprisingly accurate. The problem was people took the second to mean the first.
If I say “this stock will rise in value” and then it doesn’t, that isn’t lying. If I say that while knowing the CEO is committing felonies, it still wouldn’t be lying, but it would be problematic. If I say “this is a share of Apple” when it’s actually Twitter, that’s lying. Bad forecasts aren’t lies, they’re mistakes.
The rating agencies’ role in the crisis is interesting and nuanced, and it is difficult to fault anyone other than the investors who over-relied on (and arguably misinterpreted) their guidance.
If you look at every security the agencies rated AAA, they performed as expected in cash flows. The underlying mortgages were mostly garbage, but some kept paying. That meant the top tranche of those structures, the tranches that got a high rating, kept paying.
If you held to maturity, the securities performed as promised. (Cf: if the government hadn’t bailed out AIG, they may not have.) The problem was they crashed in value in the interim because people began doubting if they would perform. That was a problem for liquidity-constrained investors, which was almost everyone in 2008. Rating agencies don’t say “this bond won’t trade at 50¢ on the dollar.” They say “this bond will probably pay you back.” And in the latter assessment, they were surprisingly accurate. The problem was people took the second to mean the first.