[tetrep]

> Finally, in the interest of transparency, the Titan M firmware source code will be publicly available soon. While Google holds the root keys necessary to sign Titan M firmware, it will be possible to reproduce binary builds based on the public source for the purpose of binary transparency.

and

> Transparency around every step of the design process — from logic gates to boot code to the applications — gives us confidence in the defenses we're providing for our users. We know what's inside, how it got there, how it works, and who can make changes.

This should be a boon for security researchers! I'm really looking forward to what comes out of fuzzing that whole subsystem. I imagine attacks against the secure enclave would be a lot easier to perform (and ideally, report to Apple) if it was feasible to attack it with pure software.

[jlgaddis]

> I'm really looking forward to what comes out of fuzzing that whole subsystem.

Surely Google uses (a portion of, at least) their massive compute resources to do exactly this sort of thing before these chips even get anywhere close to an assembly line or being built in to new devices? Is an independent security researcher going to be able to try anything Google themselves haven't already tried?

Or is it kind of like brute-forcing a 256-bit key where, no matter how much "firepower" you have available, you'll never come close to trying all possible combinations of inputs, etc.?

[aesh2Xa1]

It isn't so much one guy vs all of Google doing the work. It's more like the team that Google employs vs the entire rest of the infosec and academic community. This is a treasure.

[nickik]

Check out this: https://keystone-enclave.org/

Google and Titan are a large part of this effort and it will be great for security researchers.