|
|
|
|
|
by lvh
2807 days ago
|
|
> "this phone number sent a message to this phone number at this time" (information that is even stored, at least temporarily, on their servers in order to implement rate limiting) This claim appears to be unsupported by both Signal's privacy policy and public evidence. Unless I misunderstand, they've claimed to use IP addresses for rate limiting. Messages only necessarily contain the recipient's identifier for delayed delivery but certainly does not imply they have a store of (src_phone, dst_phone, hires_timestamp) triples. When subpoenaed for user data[0], they claimed to have no responsive records of IP data, let alone src, dst _and_ hi-res timestamps altogether. Are you saying that has changed, they're lying in their response to the subpoena, they were lying in their privacy policy, or something else? The issue of long-term identifiers for offline delivery is well-understood (e.g. Rottermanner05) but also not actually a Signal problem. In that light: what do you propose we do instead? (You can probably see the response coming already: let's just say metadata protection is, ahem, complicated.) [0]: https://signal.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/ |
|
https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server/blob/e26e383bd7a6...
Frankly, the fact that people like you believe so strongly that Signal doesn't do this should be damning for Signal, as it goes to show just how deceptive they are being about this issue: the reality is that Signal is quite careless with metadata :/.
(As for what you do instead, there are tons of trivial ways of making a secure messaging system that are better about metadata than Signal, and even ways that allow you to implement various forms of rate limiting. Signal is just being lazy here.)