[beaconstudios]

Your argument is that banks don't have the will to fix security issues. The parent was arguing that security is hard and that the government is not particularly competent at it so is not in a position to define raised standards. You're not even having the same conversation.

[cm2187]

Some complex CPU or encryption bugs is what makes full security hard. But most security breaches are because of people doing stupid things. Unprotected public databases or s3 buckets, sql injections, plain text / easy to guess passwords, out of date software, etc. I am ready to bet that those alone constitute more than 90% of the breaches. And this is the result of mere amateurism. If tech people do not care about security or aren't competent enough to take even the most basic steps, regulation is absolutely the right response.

[beaconstudios]

So make banks liable for damages as a result of losses from security breaches. Presumably they already are. That solves the problem.

[mhjas]

> The parent was arguing that security is hard [...]

It isn't though, at least not compared to the state of things. Pretty much any government would be competent enough to mandate some sort of two-factor authentication that would greatly improve security and make a lot of phishing and hijacking a thing of the past. Of course different governments would have different success rates, if not in terms of security at least in terms of elegance. But that is like everything else. People die everyday by the lack of road safety and healthcare.

[beaconstudios]

I used to work in the security industry, I've seen what government compliance looks like. Regulations usually sound logical and great from a shallow analysis but once you've seen some implemented you'll realise they're often atrocious at achieving their intent.

[gkya]

And what impedes their ameliorement so as to dismiss them in their entirety?

[beaconstudios]

I'm not trying to say that regulations can't and never work, just that most of the time they don't because they're extremely hard to get right. They suffer from the same problems as law - it's extremely difficult to codify intent. Couple that with the fact that lawmakers usually have very little awareness of technical details. Say for example they do in fact mandate 2FA for all banks. But then all banks rush out various implementations to meet the requirements. Some provide SMS-based solutions which have known security risks, some provide codes that don't lock out, some do everything right but now people who can't get a 2FA app (those who don't have smartphones for example) can't access online banking any more. There are accessibility concerns. In the meantime, the security industry has finally cracked federated identity, but banks can't offer it because all access has to be through their 2FA solution.

Obviously that's a fairly bad-case (though not worst-case) example of how things could play out, but I think it serves to prove my point that "just force them to do X" is not always a sound approach. Well-designed regulation using sufficient consultation with experts (actual experts rather than snake-oil consultancies) and with a view to the future and how the state of the art might change can be effective (though still not flexible enough to accommodate exceptional circumstances) but that's the exception rather than the rule.

[varrock]

> Say for example they do in fact mandate 2FA for all banks. But then all banks rush out various implementations to meet the requirements. Some provide SMS-based solutions which have known security risks, some provide codes that don't lock out, some do everything right but now people who can't get a 2FA app (those who don't have smartphones for example) can't access online banking any more. There are accessibility concerns.

I'm not qualified to speak on this subject, but these are excellent points. Could you expand on any other implementations that sound like a great idea on the surface, but would have limitations? It sounds like accessibility is just one of many concerns. I'm itching to hear more.

[beaconstudios]

those are just off the top of my head, and I'm not an expert on 2FA either. If we're talking about alternative solutions to someone logging in as someone else, you still have to provide a "2FA" solution because "2-factor" is a description of the problem to be solved (the multi-factor authentication problem) - to prove who you are in high-security situations it's insufficient to just provide something you know i.e. a password, because someone else can learn that thing. Thus you must provide "something you have" ie. proving you possess your phone via 2FA apps, or "something you are" via biometrics a la faceID. There are alternative solutions to this like USB 2FA tokens or those little pin-pads that banks provide you that are already required by most banks in order for you to access your account. Other options are proving email ownership via access links like slack does, automated phone calls, probably some other venues. But the fundamental requirement to boost password security is to provide a non-knowledge-based proof of identity.

[mhjas]

How to regulate this is up to each and every country, just like it is up to each country how to regulate things like pollution, traffic and infrastructure.

That a bank who can't handle security compromises their customers user experience rather than their customers security is a good thing.

The reason the regulate these things aren't because it is fun. It is because there are fundamental security problems that needs to and will eventually be fixed. Companies like Apple have largely already, or at least potentially, fixed these problem just only for themselves. If you want to fix it for everyone you very likely need some sort of mandate.

[beaconstudios]

> That a bank who can't handle security compromises their customers user experience rather than their customers security is a good thing.

Why do you say that? It's only true if the cost of breach of security is actually taken by the customer. The alternative is that banks are required to rebate customers for fraud caused by poor bank security, which makes sense to me because it provides financial pressure for banks to beef up security while at the same time leaving in the flexibility to define how that security is improved. It's "here's the problem you need to solve" via financial pressure, not "here's the solution you need to implement" via mandate.

[candiodari]

Oh yeah ... I see it now. Instead of the "do you accept cookies" in your face idiocies we now need to identify ourselves using 2 factor authentication on every website.

That sounds SO great.

Obviously there are no realistic security measures that are 100% effective. All this will amount to is further cementing the power of large internet companies. You know this, so why ask for it ?

[mhjas]

"Do you accept cookies" is only relevant because there isn't a separate login mechanism in HTTP. Actually knowing whether you are sharing data with the website, and what website that is, would be a major improvement. Security measures don't have to be 100% effective. Just like road safety you should focus removing the impact of flaws, not to prevent flaws as such. A separate authentication mechanism would remove a large amount of security issues, including potentially phishing and password leaks entirely. These common security issues of compromising the system of the user or the company would simply not have the same impact anymore.

A not insignificant part of the large Internet companies power comes from that they are the only ones who can handle, or people trust to handle, security. It isn't that hard today to create your own e-mail system or smart phone. But managing those systems, especially for a reasonable cost at scale, is just beyond what most new entrants in the market can handle.

[candiodari]

Government mandated authentication mechanism. This question is almost a joke: what could go wrong ?

Everything can go wrong.

> A not insignificant part of the large Internet companies power

So it's about breaking the power of large internet companies ? Figures. Can we please do that WITHOUT destroying the web ? The last regulation that tried to break the power of large internet companies was the GPDR, and that has significantly entrenched the position of the large internet companies instead, while creating a ridiculous amount of inconvenience for everybody. This ... will do the same.

People WANT to share that data. Or perhaps I should say, they want the things that happen when they do. Quick searches that get them the products they want, on Google, on Amazon, on clothing shops and on tons of small webshops. Even the obnoxious image ads. People want them.

That means that a login mechanism will just be an extra hurdle with zero of the effects you want.

[gkya]

Taking an argument to its extreme is bound to make it seem ridiculous. Certain websites require certain levels of security. Not every govt building has troops with war grade guns waiting them.

[candiodari]

Perhaps, but would you have said the same if I put a comment about "accept cookies" nonsense in a pre-GPDR discussion ?

So ... perhaps not.