| I have been reading through the proposed law (see my posts elsewhere in this thread) and I have to say that I disagree with your assessment that the law implies or requires targetting of specific individuals or groups rather than dragnet-style operations. Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be anything in the bill to limit the scope of a TCN/TAN so that the government agencies can't use a single request to cover a wide range of unrelated cases/investigations. As it is written, it seems that a TCN/TAN could require that a company builds and signs arbitrary code that is handed to them by a government agency. [1] This code would be the backdoor (or Remote Access Tool or whatever they choose to they call it) and likely would be distributed as a software update (possibly also by the company although there might be some legal wrangling about whether the government might be required to host the backdoored software themselves). What this all means is that a single TCN could theoretically be issued to cover a specific case (say a reasonable investigation into some potential terrorist activity) but the signed backdoor/remote access tool that comes out of it could be used arbitrarily by the agencies involved with little to no oversight. I know that this is a difficult area for law-enforcement to operate in and I understand that part of the problem that they have at the moment is that they sometimes have no certainty about whether they can get access to specific pieces of electronic evidence (even with a warrant) but the intelligence community (including here in Australia) has a lot of bridges to build if they want to actually have this discussion in a rational manner. There are probably some reading this who think that I am being hysterical or paranoid about ASIO/ASIS/ASD and that they are rational and ethical actors, but I suspect that anyone who thinks that is likely under informed about their historical activities. There is currently some international investigation into evidence of recent (in the last 15 years) potential wrongdoing [2] that the current Attorney General (who would be the individual responsible for approving these TCN/TANs) is attempting to frustrate. [3] These moves by the current federal AG are so extraordinary that a former NSW DPP (Director of Public Prosecution) and a former Victorian Appeals Court judge have stated that "[...] unlawful activity was undertaken on our behalf to improve the government’s negotiating position" and that "there is a genuine question about whether the general interests of Australians would be served by the prosecution of either person." (the whistle-blower or their lawyer). [4] Given the evidence of poor behavior by these agencies and their apparent disregard for due process, it seems extraordinary to think that these extensive new powers could not be abused as they are currently proposed. [1] See section 317E of the law which states that providers are required to "facilitate or assist access to software that is capable of being installed on a computer, or other equipment, that is, or is likely to be, connected to a telecommunications network" and, crucially, paragraph (f) which states that providers must "assist with the testing, modification, development or maintenance of a technology or capability" [2] In Australia bugging East Timor during negotiations over a $40-56 billion oil deal. See http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-04/icj-orders-australia-t... [3] https://theconversation.com/the-shaky-case-for-prosecuting-w... [4] https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/top-lawyers-jump-to-... |