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by Uplink
2845 days ago
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Who do I tell my brand new, bright idea about IDN attack prevention? It goes like this: Display characters that are out of range of your selected language's character set in a different colour than the characters of your language. That way, when you go to раураӏ.com that last character shows up in red. Homework: select two languages (e.g. Chinese and English), and use three colours. Make the colour scheme colour-blind-friendly. (it just came to me, I haven't thought it through; I'd rather read different coloured characters than punycode) |
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* Identify TLD registry operators who have a sane approach that prohibits or otherwise is effective for controlling homographs, whitelist their TLDs, default to showing punycode (the A-labels used by the DNS system which are always just ASCII). This has the effect that if your name looks "wrong" that's a problem to take up with your TLD registry. Note that com doesn't have such policies at all, it's a vast sleazy market and it remains interesting to me that huge global brands would rather be in that market, trying to shout over the crowd, than leave it to rot.
* Identify cases like you've described with "confusing" mixtures of scripts and display those as punycode.
Both have problems. The former requires that you effectively police TLD registry operators. Find out what their policies are, check they actually implement those policies effectively, and take action if this changes. The latter requires you figure out how all the world's language communities use different scripts, and how that interacts with Unicode, in order to avoid penalising combinations lots of people want, while still detecting attacks.