[s3m4j]

"Congratulations, you have invented the most expansive pencil"

In France we don't actually write anything. When we enter the room we're given one paper per candidate with the name and logo printed clearly. Once in the voting booth we put one or none in the enveloppe. That's it. Problem solved.

[kartan]

In Spain is the same. But political parties send you also a copy and an envelope. So you can bring your ballot from home.

If the envelope contains more than one vote, but all are the same, it counts as one. If the envelop contains more than one vote but they are different it does not count.

In the voting school there are randomly chosen citizens and party representatives that identify the voters, all adults must have a national ID, and count the votes.

It works, and it will need a massive amount of people to change a significant amount of votes.

[s3m4j]

It seems Spain and France have the exact same system.

[madengr]

Same in Russia, but we also given bottle of vodka with candidate name.

[oxide]

Is it good quality vodka?

[tehlike]

How do you verify your vote is counted correctly and not made up? Having the voting ledger would be cool - you could verify with the "transaction id" and how it's recorded.

[sitharus]

Through process verification.

I don't know about other countries, but here in New Zealand elections are monitored by the Electoral Commission who employ people to watch every step of the process. In addition every political party is entitled to send scrutineers to polling places and the count. The boxes are shown to the scrutineers who verify it to be empty, then sealed. The boxes are never taken out of sight. Every step of the process is under multiple eyes.

This seems to work well. It's possible to double vote by visiting multiple stations but in practice this is rare. It does happen but the electoral commission do analysis on the votes to ensure it didn't affect the outcome. Those responsible are prosecuted.

[aninhumer]

There is no way to implement verifiable voting which is not vulnerable to voter coercion. If you can verify your vote, so can the person threatening you.

The way to ensure the ballot is secure is to have a fully publicly verifiable end-to-end process. You should be able to watch the ballot box from the moment you put your vote in, all the way to the count.

[s3m4j]

That is also a solved problem. Polling places are only opened where representatives of all* candidates can be present plus sworn officials.

And if you think about it, you actually don't want to check that _your_ vote has been counted.

*reasonable exceptions exists

[wool_gather]

Interesting. What do you do with the other ones?

[s3m4j]

For example at the last presidential election last year there were 11 candidates, so there was a table with (simplifying) a pile of envelopes, 11 piles of papers (one for each candidate). Generally people don't take the whole 12 items with them. You would pick randomly between 2 or 11 papers (depending on your sense of theatrics) and the papers you're left with after the voting booth, in my case I crumble them and throw them in a bin. Crumbled paper can't be counted. Some people keep them in their pockets until they get home.