[zx2c4]

I still believe TunSafe's interoperability and standing security issues are significant, and that TunSafe's existence and confusion-potential are generally damaging to the WireGuard project, as has been the adversarial position of their developer. That project is going in a number of really undesirable directions from a security perspective. I would encourage folks to stay away from this software.

For those who are after Windows clients, the WireGuard project will hopefully have one quite soon, and of course we're happy to work with interested Windows developers who are working on similar projects with a security-minded attitude.

---

I'm sure the subsequent replies to this message will have plenty of outcry, demands for details, misinformation, and accusations, to bait this into a long sprawling thread. I'd like to preemptively step out of that kind of mudslinging. But I do think it's important to warn users, hence the note above.

[oarsinsync]

> If you decide you'd like to open source it at some point, rather than putting ads on it or selling it like you've done in the past with software, we can talk. But insofar as you're putting users in harm's way and fragmenting the project, I ask that you stay away from these parts. Nobody is interested in insecure software.

> Yet in spite of your to-date brazenness, I'm still willing to work with you if you'd like to turn things around. Shoot me an email if you'd like to talk about open sourcing this work and integrating with the community.

https://lists.zx2c4.com/pipermail/wireguard/2018-March/00246...

It's open source now, rather than full of ads or being sold.

In the mean time, I still have ocserv and openconnect on Ubuntu & Mac so I'm happy.

[mmozeiko]

What are the current security issues with TunSafe?

[nostream]

So far, I have not heard anyone who has found any security holes and I'm active in the #WireGuard IRC channel with 300+ users, where many have looked at the code. There may be some unscrupulous hacker who has reviewed the code and found something but choose not to publish it, but it may also apply to WireGuard's source code.

A security hole in WireGuard's wg-quick that many use to establish the connection is that it allows the .conf file to download and execute programs without asking the user, and this feature is enabled by default.

This is basically a good feature and allows admins to run custom software as soon as the connection has been established.

However, it allows an evil (or NSA-hooked) VPN provider to issue .conf files to infect the user's computer with malicious code because users of VPN services rarely review the .conf files.

TunSafe has the same feature but it is disabled by default and requires Admin privileges to enable it.

I like that TunSafe seems to have more restrictive security settings as default, though it may not be appreciated by hardcore users.

[breakingcups]

I have no dog in this fight whatsoever and I'm grateful for the work you are doing with WireGuard, but I would like to remark that at the moment the only mudslinging and accusations in this thread seem to come from yourself.

I know you pre-emptively opted out of backing up your accusations but I'm going to ask anyway because otherwise it just seems like you are spreading FUD. What are the standing security issues and interoperability issues? Also, how has the developer been adversarial in his position? I'd genuinely like to know.