[cryptobeanbaby]

what happens when one of these large mining operations in China/South pacific/etc target this network and begin accumulating all the handshake "coins".

How would someone 3 years from now have access to generate coins/tokens after the protocol increases the difficulty and stops generating coins so easily?

Wouldn't it be cheaper just to run a normal DNS server? What's the use case?

[koolba]

Even better, what happens when a mining operation decides to mount a 51% attack and take over a root resolver? If I’m understanding the point of this correctly (big if...), then they’d be able to route any TLD anywhere they’d like. Combined with DNS caching for extended chaos.

[jancsika]

They wouldn't be able to immediately route any TLD anywhere they'd like, but they could certainly screw with the network.

They would have to expend hashing power solving a previously solved block puzzle while continuing to build the blockchain off their new branch and ensure that its total difficulty is greater than any competing chain.

So suppose you immediately buy up TLD "foo", get a single confirmation on it, and publish it to your fanbase. The 51% attacker would be able to a) use their hashing power to publish their different solution to the block where your TLD got included, b) include their own purchase of "foo" in their alternate block, and c) continue building on their alternate chain to make it the canonical state of the transaction db. So your fanbase would look for "foo" and get the attacker's zone.

However, if we're five years into Handshake's existence and you hold one of the very first TLDs published in their blockchain, the attacker cannot immediately take over your TLD. They'd have to go back to the block where you made your purchase (or I guess when you renewed) and solve puzzles all the way up until the total difficulty of their chain exceeds the current canonical chain. Which they can do with 51% given enough time.

Also note that an attacker can begin/develop a 51% attack without publishing anything at all to the network.

[tialaramex]

> They wouldn't be able to immediately route any TLD anywhere they'd like

It seems to me that this can only be true if it's also impossible for the legitimate owner to change this. If it can be changed, then the 51% attacker can change it.

The actual DNS contains names with hugely long cache lifetimes and very little practical agility, and it also contains "fast flux" names whose RRs change constantly. If this experiment is only interested in the former it should highlight that, as a shortcoming.

[dboreham]

I don't think anyone has a short TTL for a record in the root zone.

[tialaramex]

24 hours seems to be common for the TLDs I looked at. That seems fairly short compared to this idea that a 51% attacker would need sustained capability to do real damage.