[n4r9]

I don't follow your reasoning at all. You seem to be quite confused over how beliefs could possibly work in a predetermined world.

Firstly, a lack of free will does not imply predetermination, since it's possible that some things are fundamentally random.

Secondly, even if everything is predetermined, it can still be the case that our choices can be influenced by our belief in free will. You could imagine two instances of a fairly simple bot which has a "isFreeWillBelieved" property. One of them has it set to true and the other to false, and they make different choices accordingly.

Thirdly, whilst we can't "opt" to believe in free will or not, whether or not we believe in it can certainly change over time due to building evidence and argumentation.

[coldtea]

>I don't follow your reasoning at all. You seem to be quite confused over how beliefs could possibly work in a predetermined world. Firstly, a lack of free will does not imply predetermination, since it's possible that some things are fundamentally random.

Predetermined or random is all the same for the sake of the argument I've made. Both are beyond the control of the subjects.

>Secondly, even if everything is predetermined, it can still be the case that our choices can be influenced by our belief in free will.

Not really. If "everything is predetermined" then we don't have choices, and what we do (the singular thing that we cannot but do) is only influenced by the start event in the casual chain (that predetermined everything).

>Thirdly, whilst we can't "opt" to believe in free will or not, whether or not we believe in it can certainly change over time due to building evidence and argumentation.

That only applies to a universe with free will. If free will doesn't exist, then evidence and argumentation doesn't matter -- as those are not the causes that shape our beliefs. Instead both our beliefs and any evidence that appears are determined from the entire predetermined casual chain (or are random, as you said, and as such, are still not based on the presence of evidence or not).

[nxc18]

Where is this ridiculous idea that you need to have free will to make choices coming from?

Free will is incompatible with the concept of choice, because all choices are bound by physical constraints. How do you make a choice without any constraints? The best you can do is random.

Think about any of the choices you made today and think about why you made them. When you take all the inputs into account, most of your outcomes are predictable or random. There's no room for free will when you start looking closely.

[n4r9]

> Predetermined or random is all the same for the sake of the argument I've made.

Fair point, I was just pointing out the first gap in the logic.

> If "everything is predetermined" then we don't have choices

Pure semantics. You can replace "choice" with "the action that occurs" in the context of my point.

> If free will doesn't exist, then evidence and argumentation doesn't matter -- as those are not the causes that shape our beliefs.

I genuinely don't see why not. Going back to the simple bot analogy, it's conceivable that a bot's "isFreeWillBelieved" field is updated based on the results returned from an "ObserveNature()" procedure. That's all I'm saying.

I think I'm starting to understand your perspective. It's like you're so entrenched in a belief that free will exists that you're clinging very tightly to definitions of words/concepts that somehow presuppose the existence of free will. For example you seem determined that the external state of the world cannot alter our internal narratives unless we have the "free will" to make that alteration ourselves. But to me, this seems to be countered quite straightforwardly by thinking about the bots with their internal belief settings.

[coldtea]

>Pure semantics. You can replace "choice" with "the action that occurs" in the context of my point.

When we talk about "free will" it's all in the semantics. The term must have a specific meaning -- else we're discussing in vain.

The action that occurs is either a:

1) a conscious choice (i.e. free will)

or:

2) a predetermined / random action (i.e. no free will)

In either case, (2) is beyond the subject's control, and that's not a merely nominal or semantic difference, it's a very real difference. In fact, it's exactly what we're debating.

>> If free will doesn't exist, then evidence and argumentation doesn't matter -- as those are not the causes that shape our beliefs.

> I genuinely don't see why not.

Probably because I didn't clarified that. I use "shape our beliefs" in the meaning that we would use the term everyday: that they enter our minds, we judge them and consider them, and through this we are influenced by them in our beliefs.

They could still "shape our beliefs" in the sense that kicking a ball will make it move.

But not in any way in which our conscious self participates in that shaping. More like a trauma would "shape" our beliefs.

>I think I'm starting to understand your perspective. It's like you're so entrenched in a belief that free will exists that you're clinging very tightly to definitions of words/concepts that somehow presuppose the existence of free will.

Not really. I'm actually pointing the consequences of free will not existing. I don't believe it exists except in a very specific way myself, which is in accordance with a deterministic universe (to sum, that our free will is exactly the inevitable choice we make because we are who we are -- i.e. directly the sum product of our prior space-time history -- and that it's both free -- as in uniquely expressing our self -- and inevitable).

>For example you seem determined that the external state of the world cannot alter our internal narratives unless we have the "free will" to make that alteration ourselves.

I gave the example in another comment on this post about a person being surgically altered to not have free will, which is the different side of the same coin.

The actions of that person would indeed be controlled by the outside world (e.g. the surgeon). But without free will, in other words, without an agent, there are no "internal narratives".

What remains would be an internal "program" -- like the bots in your example.

But a program is not a narrative in the sense of an agent consciously talking to itself.

[n4r9]

I'll explain what I mean about the semantics. Your original argument went thus:

> Per definition, if free will doesn't exist, then you can't say that "the illusion of the free will influences our lives more and in multiple ways."

By teasing apart your arguments, I now realise that you have bundled up the word "influence" into a package of meaning. You're presupposing "influence" to mean an agent consciously - and with free will - modifying their belief based on the environment. Same as what you mean by "shape our beliefs" just now. But I doubt OP was using the word "influence" that strongly; I think they were allowing for us to be machines without the free will necessary to "shape" their own beliefs. Therefore their point stands without the "endless loop".