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by Whitestrake 2890 days ago
> They will happily redirect the request

Doesn't HSTS thwart this? Unless paypal.com were omitted from the preload list, AND you had never browsed to paypal.com before with that browser, it should refuse to connect over HTTP and the attacker won't be able to issue their redirect. It will try HTTPS instead and immediately fail out of certificate validation.
2 comments
Nadya 2890 days ago
That wasn't quite what they were talking about. They were talking about IDN Phishing [0] and not http-->https redirection (which is what HSTS is directed towards). But since we're talking about DNS redirection the http:// handshake against the legitimate server never happens, you're only ever visiting a malicious website (which the certificate checks would all fail - except visually in the case of IDN phishing which only works against Firefox users).

[0] https://www.xudongz.com/blog/2017/idn-phishing/

[1] https://www.xn--80ak6aa92e.com/ (this will show the punycode domain on HN, visit it in Firefox it will look just like https://apple.com )

[2] The cert still shows punycode though most users wouldn't check the cert: https://kimiwo.aishitei.ru/i/MMFWtvE5ZgYdHWki.png

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dvfjsdhgfv 2890 days ago
No, HSTS relies on the server sending the relevant header to the web browser. In this scenario you have total control over all servers the user connects to.
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