[algorias]

I attended this talk at IJCAI, and I must say that the whole system 1 / system 2 analogy rubbed me the wrong way.

A solver for e.g. 3-SAT is general only in a very narrow sense, namely that an entire class of problems can be reduced to the specific problem it solves. However, the solver itself is not doing the reducing, rather it is being spoon-fed instances generated by somebody, and that somebody is doing all the hard work of actually thinking. The solver is just doing a series of dumb steps very quickly, with lots of heuristics thrown in. How is that not also "system 1"?

Anyway, the whole thing was just a fancy way of saying that you can either solve problems exactly, in the way that complexity theorists and algorithm designers do things, or statistically, in the way that learning theorists do things. No need to superimpose a strained analogy.

[sophistication]

Not to mention that there is no conclusive evidence of the dual process theory yet, see for example this experimental study finding that logical "type 2" answers are actually typically faster and that intuitive "type 1" answers are typically also logical:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001002771...

[naasking]

> Not to mention that there is no conclusive evidence of the dual process theory yet

Define "conclusive". There is considerable evidence for this dual reasoning mode.

As for your study, system 1 thinking is not inherently illogical. In fact, it's necessarily logical otherwise it would be maladaptive. The point is that it's logical in a "lossy" way that sometimes excludes pertinent information for speed of response, and so sometimes goes wildly wrong.

[dj-wonk]

Yes, I know what you mean. In my opinion, the connection to the System 1 / System 2 theories did not add much depth to the paper. I think the intended purpose was to bolster the argument that both learners and solvers (operating in different ways) are both useful forms of intelligence. However, this point can be made in other ways as well.

In any case, I look forward to more scholarship and experimentation at the intersection of these topics.

[nutjob2]

I'm curious to know what your definition of "actually thinking" is. I suspect your argument is circular.

[vinceguidry]

All definitions of things get circular at some point. What defines a chair? The set of criteria you come up with to divide chairs from other things has to invariably turn in on itself, as the hilarious exercise to define a sandwich illustrates. All identity is ultimately an illusion.

In other words, the more division you create in the world, the more 'specialness' you create. And in the immortal words of Syndrome, when everyone's special, no one is.

With a fine enough definition of thought, anything can fit the definition.

[eli_gottlieb]

>I attended this talk at IJCAI, and I must say that the whole system 1 / system 2 analogy rubbed me the wrong way.

It immediately rubs me in the wrong way because dual process theories of the brain are wrong and outmoded and need to die out of the public consciousness now!

I am muttering angrily in cognitive science!

[naasking]

What's the current theory in vogue?

[eli_gottlieb]

Bayesian brain theories are more "in vogue", along with various other theories saying that the brain does some forms of statistical and causal learning and inference.

[naasking]

Sure, that seems reasonable. But I don't see why statistical and causal learning and inference really preclude the evolution of a system 1/2 dualism.

[eli_gottlieb]

They don't preclude it, but they didn't happen to include it in our particular history. In particular, in the evolutionary history of the brain as an energy-optimizing controller of the body, a "System 1" would have been selected against extremely early on, when it directed the internal organs to act according to "heuristics" that wasted calories.

[naasking]

> In particular, in the evolutionary history of the brain as an energy-optimizing controller of the body, a "System 1" would have been selected against extremely early on, when it directed the internal organs to act according to "heuristics" that wasted calories.

How are the calories are wasted exactly? Our hind brain triggers autonomous reactions to various inputs. Clearly not all such reactions are adaptive, sometimes staying very still and bearing some pain or discomfort is better than death. And so we evolved higher level cognitive faculties to make better choices, just a little slower than the hind brain. This is system 1.

I don't see why the exact same pressures couldn't work at this cognitive level as well. System 1 provided more adaptive reactions to a wider range of situations, but just a little slower than the hind brain. But even still, some metacognitive faculty would yield even better reactions in some circumstances, and so we evolved system 2.

But system 1 still has tremendous significance, because it's much better than our hind brain, is sufficient for most daily scenarios, and is not as calorically expensive as system 2.

The logic behind the efficiency gains is similar to the cache hierarchy in computers. We have more than one cache level because 2-3 cache levels is pretty close to optimal when trading off density, thermal considerations, and efficiency.