[subway]

The issue is with storing your TOTP secret in the same store as your password. The idea of using MFA is that multiple secret stores must be compromised in order to grant access to a service.

If you put your TOTP secret on your phone (or Yubikey), then both your TOTP secret store (that is your phone or keychain) and 1Password store must be compromised in order to gain access to your account. TOTP is useful in this scenario.

If you put your TOTP secret in 1Password along with your site password, then only your 1Password store needs to be compromised. This is the scenario where TOTP becomes pointless.

[ubercore]

Isn't that a less likely scenario? Or at least, a subset of the possible compromises, meaning you have materially improved your security in _some but not all_ cases. I don't disagree that it's best to not have TOTP in 1password, but isn't it still _better_ than not having TOTP at all?

[jedberg]

I understand that, but it isn't it still better to store it in 1Password than not have TPOP at all? At least you're still protected against other attacks, right?

[subway]

Marginally sure, but what "other attacks" are you looking to protect against?

Most MITM scenarios are going to result in giving up at least one TOTP code -- and that TOTP code will be used to obtain a long-lived HTTP session (I can't remember when Google last had me auth).

I think it's common for folks to think that TOTP means it's safe to lose a code because it is short-lived and invalidated when a subsequent code is used (usually), but it just takes one code for a long-lived session cookie to be obtained.

If an attacker is in the position to intercept your password via MITM, Phising, whatver, they're in position to intercept your TOTP code. They're not going to sit on that code -- they're going to immediately use it to obtain their long-lived session while reporting an error back to you.