Also, what exactly is it that we mean by "free will"? Even just that question can get ugly, fast. I think I've only ever heard one definition of the concept sufficiently precise to even have a meaningful answer.
(In short, it was this: If we our model of the material universe is essentially correct, and if we assume that it is closed and that the material that we see is all there is, or at least all that can ever influence us, then suppose we define free will as the inability of any real external predictor to ever perfectly predict our actions in advance. I emphasize the word real to highlight that we are emphatically not talking about some abstract god, or something vaguely sitting outside of time, but the ability of a real device constructed out of real materials in real spacetime to predict your actions. We assumed away hypothetical infinite beings or math games at the beginning. In that case, it can be mathematically shown that you are simply too complicated to be fully correctly simulated by any system that attempts to build a model of your actions simply by external observation of you; you do not produce enough bits in your external actions to uniquely identify the state space of the inside of your head, not even if you turn the entire rest of the universe to the task (literally!). By this definition, it can be concretely answered: Yes, you have free will. Interestingly, this turns out to be true even if the universe is 100% deterministic, which definitely conflicts with most people's ideas about "free will"... but then, there's another demonstration of how rare it is for anyone to carefully define it before endlessly pontificating about it.
Also, while I consider this a valuable contribution to the field that any interested philosopher should ruminate on, I am not claiming that I 100% believe it, nor that it "solves" the problem. It is simply as I said at the beginning, the only sufficiently careful treatment of the problem that one can actually say it has an answer. Personally I find the presuppositions it is based on to be highly questionable. But it is at least worth pondering for a bit.)
> In that case, it can be mathematically shown that you are simply too complicated to be fully correctly simulated by any system that attempts to build a model of your actions simply by external observation of you; you do not produce enough bits in your external actions to uniquely identify the state space of the inside of your head, not even if you turn the entire rest of the universe to the task (literally!).
Really? Which mathematical result is this?
Do scanning techniques such as fMRI and EEG count as external?
(In short, it was this: If we our model of the material universe is essentially correct, and if we assume that it is closed and that the material that we see is all there is, or at least all that can ever influence us, then suppose we define free will as the inability of any real external predictor to ever perfectly predict our actions in advance. I emphasize the word real to highlight that we are emphatically not talking about some abstract god, or something vaguely sitting outside of time, but the ability of a real device constructed out of real materials in real spacetime to predict your actions. We assumed away hypothetical infinite beings or math games at the beginning. In that case, it can be mathematically shown that you are simply too complicated to be fully correctly simulated by any system that attempts to build a model of your actions simply by external observation of you; you do not produce enough bits in your external actions to uniquely identify the state space of the inside of your head, not even if you turn the entire rest of the universe to the task (literally!). By this definition, it can be concretely answered: Yes, you have free will. Interestingly, this turns out to be true even if the universe is 100% deterministic, which definitely conflicts with most people's ideas about "free will"... but then, there's another demonstration of how rare it is for anyone to carefully define it before endlessly pontificating about it.
Also, while I consider this a valuable contribution to the field that any interested philosopher should ruminate on, I am not claiming that I 100% believe it, nor that it "solves" the problem. It is simply as I said at the beginning, the only sufficiently careful treatment of the problem that one can actually say it has an answer. Personally I find the presuppositions it is based on to be highly questionable. But it is at least worth pondering for a bit.)