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by keldaris
2925 days ago
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> if an OS is as security conscious as OpenBSD, there isn't really a different way to operate That's really what I was getting at with my question. There's no such thing as absolute security, it is a set of tradeoffs between usability, performance and specific security guarantees. Is there a point where the OpenBSD developers would say "okay, this is a (potential or confirmed) security bug, but the mitigation is just too costly in this case"? In the post-Spectre world, it's not completely inconceivable to contemplate the possibility that, in order to retain the security guarantees most people thought they had, one might have to give up a substantial subset of the benefits of speculative execution in out of order processors. For some workloads that might mean up to two orders of magnitude in performance. I know roughly where the common operating systems would draw the line and I certainly know where I would, for my own usecases. I'm just curious about how OpenBSD works in this regard. |
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You'll find out in a couple of months why they did this. I hope you'll remember the comments you've written when that happens, because you might learn something about what OpenBSD means when they say they "strongly suspect" something.